感謝你貼了全文，
現在我把這篇文所謂的 "證據" 貼出來 ..
中文部份我直接整段貼 Google 讓他翻譯，未校正，僅供參考。
Facebook dominates Taiwan’s internet and social media landscape—about 19
million out of the island’s 23.5 million people have a Facebook account. Han
Kuo-yu’s official Facebook account was successful, racking up half a million
followers at the end of the campaign—double that of his DPP opponent, Chen.
But another group played a critical role in the campaign. A Facebook group
named “Han Kuo-yu Fans For Victory! Holding up a Blue Sky!” was created on
April 10, 2018, just one day after Han declared his candidacy for the
Kaohsiung mayoral race. At the time he was little more than an obscure
footnote in Taiwan’s politics; only a few dozen supporters showed up at his
first rally.
Facebook在台灣的互聯網和社交媒體領域占主導地位 - 台灣2300萬人中有大約1900萬人
擁有Facebook賬號。 韓國宇的官方Facebook賬號獲得成功，在競選活動結束時吸引了50
萬粉絲 - 這是他的DPP對手陳的兩倍。
但是另一個團體在競選中發揮了關鍵作用。 Facebook組織名為“韓國宇的粉絲為勝利！
舉起一片藍天！“創立於2018年4月10日，就在韓寒宣布參加高雄市長競選活動的一天之
後。 那時他只不過是台灣政治中一個不起眼的腳註; 只有幾十名支持者出現在他的第一
次集會上。
As the campaign gained momentum, the group soon grew to become the largest
unofficial community page for Han’s die-hard fans on Facebook, with a total
of more than 61,000 members by the election in November. (It currently has
88,000 members.) Users promoted Han through posting talking points, memes,
and very often fake news attacking Han’s opponent Chen, the DPP government,
and anyone who said a bad word about Han.
Thousands of such posts were shared through the group during the campaign,
making it a hub for Han supporters to create, disseminate, and amplify
weaponized information in their respective corner of social media, messaging
apps, friend circles, or the family dinner table. Fake news originating from
this group often made its way to Line, a WhatsApp-alike messaging app used by
most digitally connected Taiwanese.
隨著競選活動的蓬勃發展，該集團很快成長為Facebook上漢族頑固粉絲最大的非官方社區
頁面，11月份的選舉總數超過61,000名。 （它目前有88,000名成員。）用戶通過發布談
話點，模因以及經常假冒新聞攻擊韓的對手陳，民進黨政府以及任何對漢說不好的人來推
廣韓。
在活動期間，通過該小組共享了數千個這樣的帖子，使其成為漢族支持者在社交媒體，消
息應用程序，朋友圈或家庭餐桌的各個角落創建，傳播和放大武器化信息的中心。 來自
這個群體的假新聞經常走向Line，這是一個類似WhatsApp的消息應用程序，大多數數字連
接的台灣人都使用它。
Their menacing effects did not go unnoticed by the DPP’s Chen, whose
campaign held a press conference denouncing and threatening to sue a few
specific users of the group for spreading obviously fake news. One
particularly prolific user, Chen’s campaign alleged, could be traced back to
an “overseas IP address.” A close aide to Chen confirmed to me, however,
that their campaign did not attempt to track down who created the unofficial
fan group in the first place.
As it turned out, the group was not spontaneously created by Han’s fans. It
was created, managed, and nurtured by what looks very much like a
professional cybergroup from China.
他們的威脅影響並沒有被民進黨陳水扁忽視，他們的競選活動舉行了新聞發布會，譴責並
威脅要起訴該組織的一些特定用戶傳播明顯假新聞。 陳的活動據稱，其中一位特別多產
的用戶可以追溯到“海外知識產權地址”。然而，陳的一位親密助手向我證實，他們的競
選活動沒有試圖追查誰在第一次創建非官方粉絲團體 地點。
事實證明，這個小組並非由韓的粉絲自發創造。 它是由一個看起來非常像中國的專業網
絡群體創建，管理和培育的。
The group page listed six administrators in November 2018. Two of them, under
the usernames “Fang Jianzhu” and “Yun Chi,” are listed as having joined
the group on April 10, 2018, when it was first launched by Fang. Another
admin, “Chen Geng,” joined on April 18, while all the others joined many
months later. Fang, Yun, and Chen apparently had the foresight to create a
fan group for Han months before he became a viral hit.
Except that wasn’t a coincidence. I identified three profiles on the
professional networking site LinkedIn that corresponded to the same Chinese
names as Fang’s, Yun’s, and Chen’s.
該組頁面在2018年11月列出了六名管理員。其中兩個用戶名“方劍柱”和“雲池”，於
2018年4月10日由方先生首次推出時被列為加入該組。 另一名管理員“陳庚”於4月18日
加入，而所有其他人在幾個月後加入。 Fang，Yun和Chen顯然有先見之明，在他成為病毒
之前為韓建立了一個粉絲團。
除了這不是巧合。 我在專業網站LinkedIn上發現了三個與Fang，Yun和Chen相同的中文名
字的個人資料。
All three LinkedIn profiles identified themselves as employees of Tencent—
China’s giant technology and social media company, which owns the world’s
largest messaging app, WeChat, and which cooperates closely with the Chinese
government in enforcing censorship and mass surveillance. The three also all
claim to be graduates of China’s Peking University, and two of them describe
themselves as having “worked in public relations for many foreign companies.
”
所有三個LinkedIn個人資料都認為自己是騰訊中國巨型技術和社交媒體公司的員工，該公
司擁有全球最大的消息應用程序微信，並與中國政府密切合作，實施審查和大規模監控。
這三人都聲稱自己是中國北京大學的畢業生，其中兩人稱他們“為許多外國公司從事公
共關係工作”。
Of course, there’s no evidence other than their own claim that the creators
of these profiles actually worked for Tencent. But a search for this very
specific Chinese phrase “worked in public relations for many foreign
companies” (在多家外企做过公关) yielded a further 249 search results on
LinkedIn—every single one sharing identical characteristics, including
mugshot-style photos cropped from decades-old graduation pictures and claims
of being Tencent employees and Peking University graduates. This particular
search phrase ceased to work on LinkedIn in late May, but many of the
profiles are still searchable through Google.
The profiles have some tell-tale signs of being fakes. Several of them use
the same photo, but a different name, and most have few and sometimes no
LinkedIn connections at all. And all of them use simplified Chinese
characters, instead of the traditional Chinese used in Taiwan.
當然，除了他們自己聲稱這些配置文件的創建者實際上為騰訊工作之外，沒有其他證據。
但是，搜索這個非常具體的中文短語“在許多外國公司的公共關係中工作”（在多家外
企做過公關）在LinkedIn上產生了另外249個搜索結果 - 每一個都有相同的特徵，包括拍
攝的照片風格的照片 從幾十年前的畢業照片和聲稱成為騰訊員工和北京大學畢業生。 這
個特定的搜索短語在5月底停止在LinkedIn上運行，但許多配置文件仍可通過Google搜索
到。
這些簡介有一些假貨的跡象。 他們中的一些人使用相同的照片，但名稱不同，大多數人
都很少，有時根本沒有LinkedIn連接。 所有這些都使用簡體中文字符，而不是台灣使用
的繁體中文。
I first discovered the connection in December 2018 and have been observing
their activities since then. All three Facebook profiles in question appear
to have gone dormant and haven’t posted anything since Nov. 24, 2018. The
fan group page on Facebook has taken on a life of its own since the election—
now, it seems to be managed by a handful of other active administrators with
uncertain connection with Fang, Yun, and Chen.
It’s unclear how the Facebook group went from a handful of members to its
current numbers. Part of it was undoubtedly Han’s own charisma driving
interest in his campaign. But it’s also likely that the administrators paid
to promote the group on Facebook, where Chinese state media has also brought
itself a considerable presence.
我在2018年12月首次發現了這種聯繫，並從此開始觀察他們的活動。 自2018年11月24日
以來，所有三個Facebook個人資料似乎已經處於休眠狀態並且沒有發布任何內容。自選舉
以來，Facebook上的粉絲群頁面已經過了自己的生活 - 現在，它似乎是由 少數其他與
Fang，Yun和Chen有不確定關係的活躍管理員。
目前還不清楚Facebook集團如何從少數成員轉向目前的數據。 其中一部分無疑是漢族自
己的魅力推動了他的競選活動。 但也有可能是管理員付錢在Facebook上推廣這個群體，
而中國的官方媒體也為自己帶來了相當大的影響力。
Multiple social media and national security experts have privately examined
this finding and were dumbfounded that a professional cybergroup potentially
organized by the Chinese state would have left such relatively obvious
traces. But they were all in agreement that the three Facebook users and 249
profiles on LinkedIn are unmistakably linked.
The cybergroup’s use of simplified Chinese and the way in which the profiles
were set up provide critical clues to their origin, according to an expert
surnamed Chu, the executive director of a major social media marketing
company in Taiwan, who wishes to remain anonymous. Chu said that LinkedIn has
a very limited presence and user base in Taiwan, and the group’s extensive
presence there suggests they are unlikely to be Taiwanese. Citing his
knowledge of the industry, Chu said he does not know of any social media
marketing firm in Taiwan—even those he knew that were hired by the KMT, that
would have operated this same way this particular group did.
多家社交媒體和國家安全專家私下審查了這一發現，並且愚蠢地認為，中國政府可能組織
的專業小組會留下這種相對明顯的痕跡。但他們都同意這三個Facebook用戶和LinkedIn上
的249個個人資料是明確無誤的。
據台灣一家大型社交媒體營銷公司的執行董事Chu表示，該網站集團對簡體中文的使用以
及簡介的設置方式為其起源提供了重要線索，他希望保持匿名。 Chu表示，LinkedIn在台
灣的存在和用戶群非常有限，該集團在那裡的廣泛存在表明他們不太可能是台灣人。朱先
生引用他對這個行業的了解，他說他不知道台灣的任何一家社交媒體營銷公司 - 即使是
他所知道的那些被國民黨僱傭的公司，也就是這個特定組織的運作方式。
LinkedIn is known to be one of Beijing’s favorite playgrounds for conducting
espionage and influence operations. Both U.S. and German intelligence
agencies have documented numerous cases of suspected Chinese spies exploiting
the networking site for intelligence purposes. Their favorite technique is to
create mass fake accounts and identities—sometimes hundreds if not thousands
of them—and use them to approach and recruit unsuspecting targets (often
Western nationals) who would then leak secrets or become assets for Chinese
intelligence handlers in the real world.
眾所周知，LinkedIn是北京最受歡迎的從事間諜活動和影響行動的遊樂場之一。 美國和
德國情報機構都記錄了許多涉嫌中國間諜利用網絡網站進行情報的案件。 他們最喜歡的
技術是創造大量假賬戶和身份 - 有時數百甚至數千 - 並用它們來接近和招募毫無戒心的
目標（通常是西方國民），然後洩露秘密或成為現實世界中的中國情報處理者的資產。
Ying-Yu Lin, an assistant professor at Taiwan’s National Chung Cheng
University and an expert on the Chinese military, believes the cybergroup can
be traced back to the Strategic Support Force (SSF) of China’s army.Ying-Yu
Lin, an assistant professor at Taiwan’s National Chung Cheng University and
an expert on the Chinese military, believes the cybergroup can be traced back
to the Strategic Support Force (SSF) of China’s army. The SSF was created in
December 2015 as part of a massive military reorganization initiated by
Chinese President Xi Jinping, and it was made into an independent branch of
the Chinese military that is now charged with conducting a wide range of
operations including space, cyber, and electronic warfare. Citing a report by
the U.S. cybersecurity firm FireEye last year, Lin said that Chinese
cyberespionage activities heated up in late 2018, as a number of major
Chinese hacker groups were observed to have returned to active duty after a
few years of being dormant during the army’s reorganization.
台灣國立中正大學助理教授，中國軍隊專家林英玉認為，這一小團體可以追溯到中國軍隊
的戰略支持部隊（SSF）.Ying-Yu Lin，助理教授台灣國立中正大學和中國軍方專家認為
，小團體可以追溯到中國軍隊的戰略支援部隊（SSF）。 SSF成立於2015年12月，是中國
國家主席習近平發起的大規模軍事重組的一部分，並成為中國軍隊的一個獨立分支，現在
負責進行廣泛的行動，包括太空，網絡和電子戰。 Lin引用美國網絡安全公司FireEye去
年的一份報告稱，中國的網絡間諜活動在2018年末升溫，因為中國的一些主要黑客組織在
軍隊休眠幾年後被視為已經恢復現役。重組。
If Lin is correct, this would be the first confirmed case of China’s new
cyberforce attempting to influence foreign elections. U.S. experts on the
Chinese military previously warned that the reorganized SSF could become
Beijing’s favorite tool to unleash a new generation of informational and
psychological warfare against foreign adversaries, learning from Russia’s
interference in the 2016 U.S. presidential election.
But another expert has a different assessment. A psychological operations
officer serving with the Political Warfare Bureau under Taiwan’s Ministry of
National Defense who uses the pen name “Lieutenant Ho” believes this
particular cybergroup was likely a private team contracted through a Chinese
company rather than being a dedicated military or intelligence unit in itself
—albeit with the Chinese government ultimately pulling the strings.
如果林是正確的話，這將是中國新的網絡力量試圖影響外國選舉的第一個確認案例。 美
國駐華軍事專家此前曾警告稱，重組後的蘇格蘭皇家軍隊可能成為北京最熱門的工具，可
以對抗外國對手發動新一代信息和心理戰，學習俄羅斯對2016年美國總統大選的干涉。
但另一位專家有不同的評估。 一名心理操作官員在台灣國防部的政治戰局工作，使用筆
名“何昊中尉”認為這個特殊的小團體可能是一個通過中國公司簽約的私人團隊，而不是
一個專門的軍事或情報部門。 - 與中國政府最終拉開了聯繫。
“They put in little effort to clean up the digital traces after the job was
done; this could suggest whoever contracted them in the first place didn’t
give out such instructions, or maybe they never saw the need for doing so,”
Ho said. “This could explain why they used Tencent as a cover on LinkedIn,
because the name of a big Chinese company can allow them to fool people
elsewhere.”
This would not be the first time that Beijing has attempted to manipulate
Taiwanese social media, Ho said. Though he cannot reveal his full name due to
being in active service in Taiwan’s military, Ho has published articles in
Taiwan’s the News Lens criticizing the passiveness and ineffectiveness of
Taiwan’s defense against information and psychological warfare waged by
China.
“在工作完成後，他們付出了很少的努力來清理數字痕跡; 這可能表明，首先與他們簽約
的人沒有發出這樣的指示，或者他們從未看到過這樣做的必要性，“何說。 “這可以解
釋為什麼他們使用騰訊作為LinkedIn的封面，因為一家大型中國公司的名字可以讓他們欺
騙別人。”
何說，這不是北京第一次試圖操縱台灣的社交媒體。 何先生雖然因為在台灣軍隊的現役
而無法透露自己的全名，但卻在台灣的新聞鏡頭上發表文章批評台灣防禦中國發動的信息
和心理戰的被動和無效。
Ho and his colleagues tracked down a number of Facebook pages and content
farms made to look like Taiwanese ones but that were assessed to be operated
by the Chinese Communist Party’s Publicity Department. These findings were
never disclosed to the public by Taiwan’s high leadership even after they
were duly reported within the system. Mysteriously, those Facebook pages soon
changed talking points and partisan stance and looked nothing like they did
before, Ho revealed in one article.
Ho和他的同事追踪了許多Facebook頁面和內容農場，看起來像台灣人，但被評估為由中國
共產黨的宣傳部門運作。 這些調查結果從未被台灣高層領導向公眾透露，即使在系統內
正式報告之後。 Ho在一篇文章中透露，神秘地說，那些Facebook頁面很快改變了談話要
點和黨派立場，看起來沒有像以前那樣。
On Facebook and elsewhere, Han’s zealous followers are known to be extremely
aggressive toward his opponents and critics. For example, a DPP legislator’s
Facebook page was flooded with more than a million hate comments soon after
she made a scathing remark about Han. During the 2018 campaign, whenever DPP’
s Chen attempted to livestream on Facebook, as Han sometimes did, he was
bombarded with hundreds of hate comments. Allegations abound that a number of
Han’s fans were Chinese netizens or even Beijing’s paid trolls, but proving
systematic interference beyond finding some random Chinese users has been a
difficult task—until now.
But Lin, Ho, and other experts believe these are merely the tip of the
iceberg in China’s massive interference operations in Taiwan’s local
elections last year. They say there were many other groups, pages, content
farms, and platforms out there beyond Facebook that Beijing used to propel
Han to electoral success
There is no evidence Han himself colluded with this group or any other. But
he was certainly aware that his support online was somewhat mysterious. “I
don’t know who they are, but I thank them for the support,” was Han’s
standard response to the accusations that unknown digital forces possibly
originating in China were driving his campaign and popularity.
Han Kuo-yu is officially in the race for the KMT’s presidential primary for
2020 election, where his main competitor is Terry Gou, Taiwan’s richest man
and the owner of Foxconn, which manufactures iPhones in China for Apple. If
he is successful in gaining the nomination, he will face off against DPP
President Tsai Ing-wen in the general election next January. High-level U.S.
officials have already publicly warned that China will again interfere, even
specifically citing social media as a battleground. The question is: Will
Taiwan be able to do anything about it?
在Facebook和其他地方，韓的熱心追隨者被認為對他的對手和批評者極具攻擊性。例如，
民進黨立法者的Facebook頁面在她對漢族發表嚴厲評論後不久就被淹沒了超過一百萬的仇
恨評論。在2018年的競選活動期間，每當民進黨的陳某試圖在Facebook上直播時，正如韓
有時所做的那樣，他遭到了數百次仇恨評論的轟炸。指控比比皆是，韓國的一些粉絲是中
國網民，甚至是北京的付費巨魔，但除了找到一些隨機的中國用戶之外，證明系統性干擾
一直是一項艱鉅的任務 - 直到現在。
但林，何和其他專家認為，這些只是中國去年在台灣地方選舉中大規模干預行動的冰山一
角。他們說除了Facebook之外還有許多其他的團體，網頁，內容農場和平台，北京曾用它
來推動漢族的選舉成功
沒有證據證明韓本人與這個團體或任何其他團體勾結。但他當然知道他在網上的支持有點
神秘。 “我不知道他們是誰，但我感謝他們的支持，”韓寒對這些指控的標準回應是，
可能源於中國的未知數字力量正在推動他的競選活動和受歡迎程度。
韓國宇正式參加國民黨2020年總統選舉的競選，他的主要競爭對手是台灣首富郭台銘和富
士康的老闆，富士康在中國為蘋果生產iPhone。如果他成功獲得提名，他將在明年1月的
大選中面對民進黨總統蔡英文。美國高層官員已經公開警告中國將再次干涉，甚至特別引
用社交媒體作為戰場。問題是：台灣能否對此採取任何行動？
==
結果文章裡自己寫一堆 "沒有明確證據" ..
然後講的好像一堆證據，很棒。
※ 引述《howiekuohr (哈維)》之銘言：
: Q: 數據跟假帳號是不是真的？
: A: 是
: Q: 作者484曾經加入DPP
: A: 是
: Q: 這是權威雜誌嗎？
: A: 是
: 換句話說數據跟五毛假帳號為真。
: 但是作者唯一的疑竇就是立場是公正性。
: 而此文也經過大雜誌審核通過。
: 這哪叫假新聞？！
: 看中時高潮，是我們鬼島天真的韓粉。
: 原文：
: https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/06/26/chinese-cyber-operatives-boosted-taiwans-in
: surgent-candidate/
: 參考范琪婓說法：
: https://www.facebook.com/264112860604956/posts/934515970231305
: 我對中國網軍入侵台灣選舉的說法，一直非常保留。
: 許多新聞界好友，都私下承認，中國的態度對編輯方針有絕對影響力。很多人苦笑說，每天
: 報稿像是報到北京。我當時想，台灣媒體被收攏成這樣，中國幹嘛花力氣去做假新聞?
: 更重要的是，證據。
: 不能因為民進黨政府說了算，也不能因為美國政府說了算。憑直覺的，請你站再後面一點。
: 這個證據的提供非常困難，不但要專業，而且要資金。
: 美國為了俄羅斯是否意圖影響美國選舉，成立了一個特別檢察官，花了三年的時間，寫出了
: 一個報告，才確立了“俄羅斯確有介入美國選舉的意圖及作為"。根據特別檢察官穆勒的說
: 法，川普團隊因只是”被動“配合，但不是知情參與，白話文就是太笨被人利用，所以不算
: ”共謀"。(註1)
: 但這個報告到現在還是一大堆人不相信。穆勒還是得要到國會出席說明。
: 台灣沒有特別檢察官也沒資源，證據從那來?
: 這是為什麼今天看到“外交政策"此文差點高潮。雖然不像穆勒團隊能找到馬其頓的網軍本
: 人，但至少花了力氣去做調查，搭配天下雜誌之前針對PTT的數據的分析，現在再講”中國
: 網軍介入台灣選舉”的說法，可信度就高了很多。
: 我今天答應陪我老公去看“寄生上流”。反應會慢一點。
: 只節一段:
: 透過對「韓國瑜粉絲後援團必勝！撐起一片藍天」的臉書群組的檢視：
: 『本調查的發現在發表前曾由多名社群媒體和國安專家私下檢驗過，許多專家都很驚訝看似
: 中國政府組織的專業網軍集團竟然也會留下有點明顯的蛛絲馬跡，但專家們的看法都一致認
: 為，那三名韓粉群臉書管理員用戶與領英上的249人網軍集團，是有絕對的關聯。』
: https://www.thenewslens.com/article/121405
: 註1 : https://pse.is/HUD98