【2017 心智哲學研究所春季系列演講】
意識與認知：哲學與科學的跨領域觀點
【主講人】Sascha Fink
（德國馬德堡大學哲學-神經科學-認知學程 助理教授）
【講題】經驗的私密性
時間：2017年2月21日星期二，下午2:00~4:00
地點：陽明大學第二教學大樓4樓243教室（電梯請按5樓）
報名網址：https://goo.gl/forms/WNrcV0l9E8Mue5gJ2
簡介：
傳統上，我們認為自己的感官經驗是無法共享的，自己的感覺和經驗，只有自己能感受，
其他人無法觸及，這是意識的「私密性」。由於此特性，以科學（客觀的）方法研究（主
觀、私密的）意識，面臨各種困境。Sascha Fink（德國馬德堡大學哲學-神經科學-認知學
程）以哲學的觀點，探討意識的私密性，如何為意識的科學解套。
Abstract
According to a traditional view, some parts of our mental life are hidden
from others, the phenomenal aspects being probably the best candidate: I can
know first-hand what my dream was like, but I can keep others from knowing
about my dreams. All that anybody else but me can claim about my dreams is
second-hand, relying on testimony, or is inferred by some fallible theory or
supported by some more or less reliable evidence. Several prominent
neuroscientists (Edelman & Tononi 2000, Frith 2007, Kosslyn & Ochsner 1994,
Palmers 2003, Seth 2010) believe that the privacy of phenomenal experiences
raises methodological issues for researching consciousness and limits its
scope: Either a science of consciousness cannot be strongly objective, or is
limited only to the structural aspects of experiences, or fails to uphold
scientific anarchism. In this talk, I analyze which notion of privacy would
be necessary to raise such a strong problem. However, I am skeptical that we
have reason to believe that phenomenality is private in such a strong sense.
Conceptual and empirical arguments show that phenomenality is not public. But
not everything that is not public is directly private. So I illustrate a
possibility how phenomenality in the actual world can be neither public nor
private. In such a "Conscious Clubs", different subjects may share first-hand
access to the same phenomenal token. If accepted, any argument for limiting the
scope of consciousness studies based on some alleged privacy fails.
＊本場演講將以英語進行
歡迎對心靈哲學、意識研究以及哲學的跨領域探討感興趣的朋友們一起來共襄盛舉！