[翻譯]費城76人前總經理，山姆辛基辭職信全文翻譯
本文引自虎撲籃球七六人區，為尊重極其辛苦的中譯者，敝人不更動其中的中國慣用詞，
僅將簡體譯成繁體，人名部分由於有英文對照，所以也不改了（謎之音：好懶啊～）
以下是正文，非常長！！！
由elfensin 發表在虎撲籃球·76人專區 https://bbs.hupu.com/sixers
寫在前面：
原譯者今年夏天就31周歲了，90年代幫主最巔峰的時候在讀小學，雖然當時也對NBA有一
點點瞭解，但是除了幫主之外好像也不認識什麼其他人。真正第一次看NBA是在初一的時
候，也就是00-01賽季。一眼就迷上了那個180出頭的小個子。總決賽的時候即使周邊所有
人都看好湖人，我還是固執的看好76人。
之後AI離開過，也回來過，直到最後退役了，但是我對76人這支球隊的感情慢慢的從一個
球星密變成了隊密。球星方面其實之後最喜歡的一直是詹姆斯，不過卻從來沒變成過騎士
隊密熱火隊密。玩2K也從來都是主隊76人，我還記得2K14玩MC的時候，一開始會多次重新
開始遊戲，只為了選秀的時候被76人選中。
前幾年76人最低谷的時候真的挺難過的，當然好在那幾年詹姆斯打的還不錯，所以總體也
還行。還記得那時候在SHH，76人被各種噴。有很多是不看76人球的人在瞎BB，但是也有
很多真的沒法反駁，當然我不愛在網上和人各種辯論也是一個原因。這賽季76人起勢後，
每場打的好的比賽我都在心裡喊：敲裡嗎，讓你們看不起我們！哈哈，戲有些足。
回歸正題，現在這支76人可以說整體上就是通過辛基的努力而建成的。無論是中國還是美
國，辛基在職的幾年都被各種噴，但是當他真正離開了之後，人們卻發現辛基當時做的多
麼出色。領先半步是先知，領先一步為先烈。辛基就一不小心“先烈”了。
第一次看到這封辭職信的相關內容，是從之前的美國JRS帖子
(https://bbs.hupu.com/21888969.html)看到的（原文在那帖子裡有連結）。當時就對這
封信的內容充滿了好奇。湊巧季後賽即將開始，這支球隊也要第一次面對季後賽的挑戰，
所以就鬥膽自己嘗試翻譯了一下。本人不才，雖然也在澳洲待過5年，雅思也考過7.5，閱
讀有8分。但是不敢說自己英語很好。特別是翻譯要遠比自己看一遍難多了，很多時候都
知道是什麼意思，卻發現不知道該如何去翻譯出來。所以這篇翻譯我只能盡可能的讓它讀
起來通順，易懂。卻無法做到任何美感。如果有哪位英語很好的朋友，覺得原文有問題，
可以直接私信我來讓我進行修改。
原文一共是13頁，前半部分主要講了辛基自己思考的一些方法，後半部分才會更加細節的
分析自己在76人的做的一些事情。
====================================起始分割線
====================================
To the equity partners of Philadelphia 76ers, L.P.:
致費城76人的所有股權合夥人：
I hope this letter finds you well. I have been serving the Sixers at your
pleasure for the past 34 months. Atul Gawande, a Surgeon at Brigham and Women
’s Hospital in Boston, remains (from afar) one of my favorite reads. He
laughs that reading scientific studies has long been a guilty pleasure.
Reading investor letters has long been one of mine.
我希望你們能夠讀到這封信。我在過去的34個月中一直為76人隊服務。阿圖葛文德，
波士頓Brigham & Women’s 醫院的外科醫生，是我長久以來最喜愛的作者之一。他笑稱
閱讀科學研究對他來說已經變成了一種帶有負罪感的快感。對我來說，我的負罪感的快感
來自於閱讀投資者的信。
What I hope to accomplish here is to give you insight into what has
transpired behind the scenes in ways you might not have otherwise heard
about. Many of you attended our most recent board meeting in New York, where
many of these topics were addressed. But for all twelve of you, I hope that
this provides a deeper look into what you have at your organization.
Accordingly, you should anticipate some mild cheerleading (of others)
sprinkled with a healthy dose of self-flagellation about things I’ve done
wrong.
我這裡希望能夠給你們帶來一些關於幕後已經發生過的事情的觀點，你們可能從未從
其他地方聽說過這些東西。你們中很多人都參加了我們最近在紐約召開的股東大會，很多
話題在那個會議上已經提到過了。但是我希望這封信能夠為你們提供一個對於你們所擁有
的組織的更加深入的看法。因此，對於我做錯的事情，你們應該預感到一些溫和的歡呼以
及一些零星的自責。
There has been much criticism of our approach. There will be more. A
competitive league like the NBA necessitates a zig while our competitors
comfortably zag. We often chose not to defend ourselvesagainst much of the
criticism, largely in an effort to stay true to the ideal of having the
longest view in the room. To attempt to convince others that our actions are
just will serve to paint us in a different light among some of our
competitors as progressives worth emulating, versus adversaries worthy of
their disdain. Call me old-fashioned, but sometimes the optimal place for
your light is hiding directly under a bushel.
現在有很多針對我們的做法的批評，接下來可能會有更多。在一個充滿競爭的聯盟內
，像NBA，總是需要一些與眾不同的做事方法。通常針對這些批評，我們很少為自己進行
辯護。大致上來說，為了將工作維持在正確的道路上，需要把眼光放在最長遠的地方。為
了嘗試去說服他人，我們的所作所為顯得特別顯眼。一些我們的競爭對手可能逐漸覺得我
們的行為值得效仿，但另一些會對我們輕視。請儘管叫我為一個老傳統，但有時候最佳的
處境就是不露鋒芒。
Lastly, this letter will only speak to the part of the business that I’m
today’s steward of: the basketball team and its attendant operations. With
Scott O’Neil running our business operations, you are in good hands. I can
assure you that when your team is eventually able to compete deep into May,
Scott will ably and efficiently separate the good people of the Delaware
Valley from their wallets on your behalf. Worry not.
最後，這封信中的內容只針對我今天所服務的業務部分：球隊和它的相關運營人士。
你們應該對由斯科特奧尼爾所領導的商業組織感到放心。我能像你們保證，等你們的球隊
能夠在五月更進一步的時候（參加季後賽），斯科特有能力將Delaware Valley地區的人
民的口袋掏空。完全不用擔心。
A league with 30 intense competitors requires a culture of finding new,
better ways to solve repeating problems. In the short term, investing in that
sort of innovation often doesn’t look like much progress, if any. Abraham
Lincoln said “give me six hours to chop down a tree and I will spend the
first four sharpening the axe.”
一個有30支充滿競爭力的球隊所組成的聯賽，需要有一個獨特的文化。這種文化要能
有效的發現更新的、更好的方法去解決一些重複性問題。短期來看，對創新的投資可能看
不出什麼效果。亞伯拉罕林肯說過：“讓我用6小時去砍一棵樹，我會先花4小時去磨斧頭
。”
In May of 1969, a 38-year-old Warren Buffett sat down at a typewriter to
inform his investors that he was closing his fund (then Buffett Partnership).
His reason: market conditions were such that he no longer had the requisite
confidence that he could make good decisions on behalf of the investors and
deliver on his commitments to them. So he would stop investing on their
behalf.
在1969年5月，38歲的沃倫巴菲特坐在一台打字機前，告知他的投資人他將要關閉自己
的基金（當時的巴菲特合夥公司）。他的原因是：市場環境如此，他已經不再有信心繼續
制定對他的投資人有益的決定，並達成他的之前的承諾。所以他會停止代表他的投資人進
行投資。
For me, that’s today. Given all the changes to our organization, I no
longer have the confidence that I can make good decisions on behalf of
investors in the Sixers—you. So I should step down. And I have.
對我來說，那一天就是今天。對我們的組織來說，我已經不再有信心能夠繼續制定對
76人隊的投資人，也就是你們，有益的決定。所以我可能需要停下來了，並且我也這麼做
了。
In one sense, it pains me that it has come to this and that I would go at
the end of a particularly down year in the standings, one that has been
painful for all of us. But the fact is—and a young Buffett said it much
better than I ever could—“I am not attuned to this environment, and I don’
t want to spoil a decent record by trying to play a game I don’t understand
just so I can go out a hero.”
從情感上來說，事情到了這一步讓我覺得非常難過：熬過了最低谷的幾年，卻要在一
切即將要好轉之前離開。但事實上，就像年輕的巴菲特說的那樣：“我不適應這個環境，
同時我不會為了逞能而嘗試做我不懂的事情，所以我現在能以一個英雄般的姿態離開。”
Yup.
是的，就是這樣。
Thinking about thinking
思索思索之道
I admire Seth Klarman a great deal. I am consistently impressed by his
conviction and humility, a rare combination. About their approach at Baupost,
he says, “it isn’t the only way of thinking, but it’s how we approach it.
” Below is some insight into a few things we value and how we’ve approached
decision making at the Sixers.
我非常羡慕賽斯卡拉曼（一位對沖基金經理人）。我持續不斷的被他的堅持以及謙卑
（一個非常稀有的組合）所折服。對於他們在Baupost（賽斯所在的基金組織）裡所使用
的方法，他說：“這不是經過深思熟慮後所得到的唯一的方法，但是這就是我們使用的方
法。”下面是一些我們評估一些事情的觀點，並且展示了我們到底如何在76人身上作出決
定。
First, this list is anything but exhaustive, and hardly mine alone.
Whenever possible, I think crosspollinating ideas from other contexts is far,
far better than attempting to solve our problems in basketball as if no one
has ever faced anything similar. Accordingly, this approach comes from a
frequent search into behavioral economics, cognitive science, and a lot of
observation and trial and error over my 11 years in the NBA. And mistakes.
Lots and lots of mistakes.
首先，這個列表並不詳細，也不只是我自己的看法。在任何時候，我都認為從其他環
境中獲取想法，要遠比只從籃球的角度來解決問題要好，因為從來沒有任何人面對過任何
相似的情況。因此，這個方法是對行為經濟學，認知科學，以及我11年NBA經驗中的很多
觀察、試驗以及失誤進行頻繁搜尋而得到的。當然還有失敗，很多很多很多的失敗。
To begin, let’s stand on the shoulders of Charlie Munger, a giant to me.
He is a man that’s been thinking about thinking longer than I’ve been
alive. Let’s start with him and his approach. His two-part technique is:
作為開始，我們先站在查理芒格（另一位投資家，巴菲特的夥伴）的肩膀上來看問題
。他思考真正的思維之道的時間比我的生命還長。讓我們從他和他的方法開始。他的兩步
式方法是：
1. First, what are the factors that really govern the interests involved,
rationally considered?
第一，從理性上來考慮，有哪些掌控相關利益的因素？
2. Second, what are the subconscious influences where the brain at a
subconscious level is automatically doing these things—which by and large
are useful, but which often malfunctions?
第二，有哪些大腦潛意識層自動完成的潛意識影響——其中哪些是有用的，哪些通常
是失靈的？
To do this requires you to divorce process from outcome. You can be right
for the wrong reasons. In our business, you’re often lionized for it. You
can be wrong for the right reasons. This may well prove to be Joel Embiid.
There is signal everywhere that Joel is unique, from the practice gyms in
Lawrence, Kansas to Bala Cynwyd, Pennsylvania to Doha, Qatar where he does
something awe inspiring far too regularly. We remain hopeful (and optimistic)
about his long-term playing career, but we don’t yet know exactly how it
will turn out. The decision to draft Joel third, though, still looks to me to
be the correct one in hindsight given the underlying reasoning. But to call
something that could be wrong (“failed draft pick”) right (“good decision”
) makes all of our heads hurt, mine included.
為了完成這兩步驟，你需要先把過程從結果中剝離出來。你可能會為了一個錯誤的原
因得到了一個正確的結果。在我們的行業中，你通常會因為這種瞎貓碰上死耗子的行為被
吹噓。但是你也可能為了正確的原因而得到了錯誤的結果。喬爾恩比德就很好的證實了這
點（譯者注：辛基辭職的時候恩比德還未打過一場比賽）。到處能看到能證明喬爾是多麼
獨特的信號。從堪薩斯大學的訓練館，到賓夕法尼亞的Bala Cynwyd，再到卡達杜哈，他
能把一些令人敬畏令人興奮的事情以一種常規操作的方式做出來。我們對他的長期職業生
涯保持希望（並且充滿樂觀），但是我們至今仍然不知道這將如何實現。在第三順位選中
喬爾的決定，在事後進行深層推理之後，我依然認為是一件正確的事情。但是如果僅是從
結論上來說，把一些可能錯誤的事情（失敗的選秀）叫成正確的（好的決定），仍然會讓
我們所有的決策層受傷，包括我。
So we have to look deeper at process. Here’s a go at it:
那麼我們不得不更加深入的觀察過程，下面是一個思路方法：
The importance of intellectual humility
智識上的謙遜的重要性
Lifelong learning is where it’s at. To walk down that path requires a
deep-seated humility about a) what’s knowable, and b) what each of us know.
We hire for this aggressively. We celebrate this internally. And we’ve been
known to punish when we find it woefully lacking.
終身學習是異常重要的。為了做到這一點，需要非常深層次的謙遜：a)世上有哪些可
知的，b)我們每個人都已經知道瞭解了什麼。我們為此積極的雇人。我們為此在內部慶祝
。當我們發現我們很可悲的缺乏謙遜的時候，我們又以獲得懲罰而被世人熟知。
We talk a great deal about being curious, not critical. About asking the
question until you understand something truly. About not being afraid to ask
the obvious question that everyone else seems to know the answer to. And
about the willingness to say three simple words, “I don’t know.”
我們大量的討論了保持好奇心，而不是對他人挑剔；討論了直到真正的瞭解事物之前
，不斷的提問題；討論了不怕提出一些周圍其他人看上去已經知道的顯而易見的問題；討
論了要願意說出那簡單的四個字“我不知道”。
Tesla’s Elon Musk describes his everyday stance as, “You should take the
approach that you’re wrong. Your goal is to be less wrong.” The physicist
James Clerk Maxwell described it as a “thoroughly conscious ignorance—the
prelude to every real advance in science.” Bill James of the Boston Red Sox
(and, I might add, a Kansas basketball expert) added a little flair when
asked whether the learnings available via examining evidence were exhausted:
“we’ve only taken a bucket of knowledge from a sea of ignorance.”
特斯拉的埃隆馬斯克描述了他的日常姿態，“你應該採用你犯錯了的方法。你的目標
就是越來越少的犯錯。”物理學家詹姆斯.克拉克.麥克斯韋說過“完全自醒的無知是每一
次科學進步的前奏”。當被問到通過資料分析可獲得的學識是否已經被耗盡的時候，波士
頓紅襪的比爾詹姆斯（同時也是堪薩斯籃球專家）說：“我們只是從海一樣的無知中獲得
了籃子大小的知識。”
A way to prop up this kind of humility is to keep score. Use a decision
journal. Write in your own words what you think will happen and why before a
decision. Refer back to it later. See if you were right, and for the right
reasons (think Bill Belichick’s famous 4th down decision against
Indianapolis in 2009 which summarizes to: good decision, didn’t work).
Reading your own past reasoning in your own words in your own handwriting
time after time causes the tides of humility to gather at your feet. I’m
often in waist-deep water here.
一種堅持如此謙卑的方式就是保持對自己評分。製作一本決策日誌，在做決策之前用
你自己的語言寫下你認為會發生的事情以及理由。之後再回頭看看，看看你是否做對了，
是否有正確的決策理由。當一次又一次的讀你自己手寫的，用你自己的話總結的過去行事
的原因時，會讓謙遜如同潮汐中的水一樣慢慢的聚集在你的腳邊。就我而言，我通常站在
腰深的水中。
The other reason to keep track yourself is you’re often the only one to
see the most insidious type of errors, the ones the narrative generating
parts of our lizard brains storytell their way around—errors of omission.
You don’t have a wobbly understanding of just the things you got wrong, but
the things you got right but not right enough. Listen to Charlie Munger talk
about how he and Berkshire Hathaway should be measured not by their success,
but by how much more successful they would have been if they bought more of
something: “We should have bought more Coke.”
另一個保持監測你自己的原因是，你通常是唯一一個能夠看到如此多潛在錯誤的人。
但是我們的大腦有他自己的記錄的方式：忽略發生的錯誤。你對你做錯的事情很難有一個
完整的認識。但是你所做對的事情，其實也往往不一定足夠正確。查理芒格說過，評價他
和伯克希爾哈撒韋的時候，不應該以他們現在的成功為標準，而應該以他們錯過了讓他們
更加成功的東西為標準，“我們應該買更多可口可樂的股份”。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
The necessity of innovation
創新的必要性
Investing in disruptive innovation doesn’t ferment misunderstanding, it
necessitates it. Jeff Bezos says it this way: “There are a few prerequisites
to inventing…You have to be willing to fail. You have to be willing to think
long-term. You have to be willing to be misunderstood for long periods of
time.”
對顛覆性創新的投資並不會醞釀誤解，而是需要誤解。傑夫貝佐斯這麼說過：“發明
有一些前提條件…你必須樂於接受失敗。你必須樂於進行長遠的考慮。你必須樂於在很長
的一段時間內被誤解。”
A yearning for innovation requires real exploration. It requires a
persistent search to try (and fail) to move your understanding forward with a
new tool, a new technique, a new insight. Sadly, the first innovation often
isn’t even all that helpful, but may well provide a path to ones that are.
This is an idea that Steven Johnson of Where Good Ideas Come From popularized
called the “adjacent possible.” Where finding your way through a labyrinth
of ignorance requires you to first open a door into a room of understanding,
one that by its very existence has new doors to new rooms with deeper
insights lurking behind them.
對創新的渴求需要真正的探索。它需要一個持續性的嘗試（和失敗），以通過新的工
具、新的技術、新的領悟把你的理解不斷地向前推進。遺憾的是，最初的創新嘗試通常都
沒有什麼實際用，但是它能夠指出邁向成功的路徑的方向。這是史蒂文詹森在《靈感從哪
裡來》中叫做“相鄰可能”的觀點。想要找到走出無知的迷宮的道路，首先需要先開啟一
扇走進知識的房間的門。在這個知識的房間，能找到藏在其中的到往其他更深層次領悟的
門。
In most endeavors, it’s fine to be content to woodshed until you get
something near perfect. You want that to be you. Grit matters. But it won’t
be long until some innovation makes all that effort newly obsolete. You want
that to be you, too.
在絕大多數的嘗試中，在真正接近完美之前，對現狀感到滿足也不是不能接受。每一
粒沙都很重要。但是這些滿足並不應該維持很久，因為不久之後一些創新就會使現在所有
的努力都過時。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
The longest view in the room
把眼光放在最長遠的地方
It is critical to be cycle aware in a talent-driven league. In a situation
like yours at the Sixers, where a variety of circumstances left you near a
trough in the cycle (and falling), amplifying this cycle became crucial. Today
’s outcomes for every team are heavily impacted by decisions past (who to
draft, sign, trade, hire, etc.). Jeff Bezos says that if Amazon has a good
quarter it’s because of work they did 3, 4, 5 years ago—not because they
did a good job that quarter. Today’s league-leading Golden State Warriors
acquired Draymond Green, Andrew Bogut, and Klay Thompson almost 4 years ago,
nearly 4 years ago exactly, and almost 5 years ago. In this league, the long
view picks at the lock of mediocrity.
在一個天賦驅動型的聯盟中，保持週期性的意識是非常重要的。當各種情況將你們置
於週期底部的情況下（並且繼續下降），就像76人現在這樣，放大這個週期變得非常重要
。對於任何一支球隊來說，當前的成就都是取決於過去的決定（選誰，簽誰，交易誰，雇
傭誰，等等）。傑夫貝佐斯說過，如果亞馬遜有一個季度的業績很好，那是因為他們過去
3,4,5年之前的工作導致的，而不是因為他們在這個季度工作完成的很好。如今聯盟領袖
金州勇士在大約四年前就引入了追夢格林、安德魯博古特和克萊湯普森，準確的說已經超
過四年，接近五年前。在這個聯盟裡，長遠的眼光才能避免平庸。
While some organizations (like ours) have this as part of their ethos, for
others it is the ethos. Checkout the 10,000 Year Clock. It is no mere thought
experiment, but an actual clock being designed to beplaced inside a mountain
in West Texas, wound, and left to tick and chime for ten thousand years.
Why?Because to design something that lasts that long makes us all consider
what the world will look like betwee nnow and then. In return, we might be
inspired to do something about it.
當一些組織（例如我們）只是把這條作為自己理念的一部分的時候，有一些組織完全
照著這條理念去操作。看一下萬年鐘吧，這不只是紙上談兵的試驗，而是一座在西德克薩
斯的山中被設計被製造的真實的鐘。這是一座被設計成可以運行並報時一萬年的鐘。為什
麼要設計這座鐘？因為當我們設計一些可以保持運作如此長遠時間的事物的時候，我們需
要去思考從現在到遙遠的未來，整個世界會如何看待我們。因此，我們更會為此而感到興
奮。
More practically, to take the long view has an unintuitive advantage built
in—fewer competitors. Here’s Warren Buffett in the late 80s on this topic:
“In any sort of a contest—financial, mental, or physical—it’s an enormous
advantage to have opponents who have been taught that it's useless to even
try.”Ask who wants to trade for an in-his-prime Kevin Garnett and 30 hands
will go up. Ask who planned for itthree or four years in advance and Danny
Ainge is nearly alone. Same for Daryl Morey in Houston trading for James
Harden. San Antonio’s Peter Holt said after signing LaMarcus Aldridge this
summer, “R.C. [Buford] came to us with this plan three years ago, four years
ago—seriously. And we’ve worked at it ever since.”
更實際的，把眼光放長遠些還有一個不直觀的優勢：更少的競爭對手。沃倫巴菲特在
80年代末期關於這個話題的看法：“在任何一種競爭裡，無論財務上的、精神上的、還是
身體上的，當你的對手為‘有些事情嘗試都是浪費時間’這種觀念買單的時候，這都是一
個巨大的優勢。”在聯盟裡打聽下，誰願意通過交易獲得巔峰的凱vsk內特的時候，大概
30支球隊都願意。問一下誰會提前3到4年來為這筆交易做準備的時候，大概只剩丹尼安吉
了。火箭隊的達裡爾莫雷交易得到詹姆斯哈登的時候也是一樣。聖安東尼奧的老闆皮特霍
爾特在今年夏天與拉馬庫斯阿爾德里奇簽約之後說道，“R.C.布福德（馬刺總經理）大約
三四年前就把這個方案給我們看過了，真的！我們從那時候起就開始為此而運作。”
* * * * * * * * * * * *
A contrarian mindset
保持與眾不同的觀念
This one is tricky, and getting more so in a league as healthy and popular
as the NBA that is covered by beat writers, columnists, bloggers,
commentators, and fans minute-to-minute. If you want to have real success you
have to very often be willing to do something different from the herd.
這一點非常複雜，並且越來越重要。一個健康並且流行的聯盟，就像NBA，時時刻刻都
被隨隊記者、專欄寫手、博客作家、評論員和粉絲關注著。如果你想要真正的獲得成功，
你必須有做與他人不同的事情的意願度。
A few examples might help. Step away from basketball and imagine for a
moment this is investment management, and your job is to take your client’s
money and make it grow. It’s January 1, 2015 and the S&P 500 is $171.60,
exactly the same price it has been since January 1, 1985. No fluctuation up
or down. Flat every single day. And your job for every day of the past 30
years is to make money for your clients by investing. What would you do?
有一些簡單地例子可能會幫到你們。我們先遠離籃球，並且假設你是一個投資機構，
你的工作就是賺取客戶的傭金，並且説明他成長。現在是2015年1月1日，標普500指數是
$171.60，並且從1985年1月1日起就保持在這個位置上，沒有任何的波動，指標圖每天都
是平的。並且你過去30年的日常工作就是説明客戶通過投資去賺錢。你會怎麼做？
In the NBA, that’s wins. The same 82 games are up for grabs every year
for every team. Just like in 1985 (or before). To get more wins, you’re
going to have to take them from someone else. Wins are a zerogrowth industry
(how many of you regularly choose to invest in those?), and the only way up
is to steal share from your competitors. You will have to do something
different. You will have to be contrarian.
在NBA裡，“賺錢”就是贏球。對所有球隊來說，每年都是82場比賽，1985年（或者更
早）也是。為了獲得更多的勝利，你不得不把這些勝利從別人手上搶過來。整個聯盟的勝
場數是零增長的（你們中有多少人平時會在零增長的行業投資的？），唯一能提高自己勝
場數的方法就是從競爭對手手中偷取“份額”。你必須做一些與眾不同的事情，你必須做
一個叛逆的人。
Howard Marks describes this as a necessary condition of great performance:
you have to be nonconsensus and right. Both. That means you have to find some
way to have a differentiated viewpoint from the masses. And it needs to be
right. Anything less won’t work.
霍華德馬克斯（橡樹資本創始人）口中，達成超強業績的必要條件是這樣的：你必須
與眾不同並且確保正確。兩者都必須做到。這意味著你必須找到一些方法來擁有一個與大
眾不同的視角。並且這些方法必須是正確的。少了任何一點都不行。
But this is difficult, emotionally and intellectually. Seth Klarman talks
about the comfort of consensus. It’s much more comfortable to have people
generally agreeing with you. By definition, those opportunities in a
constrained environment winnow away with each person that agrees with you,
though. It reminds me of when we first moved to Palo Alto. Within about a
week of living there a voice kept telling me, “This is great. Great weather,
30 minutes to the ocean, 3 hours to ski, a vibrant city 30 miles away, and
one of the world’s best research universities within walking distance.
People should really move here.” Then I looked at real estate prices. I was
right, yes, but this view was decidedly not a non-consensus view. My
viewpoint as a Silicon Valley real estate dilettante, which took a whole week
to form, had been priced in. Shocker.
但這非常難做到，無論是感性方面還是理性方面。塞斯克拉曼談到過隨大流是多麼令
人舒適。能夠處在一個有很多同意你的觀點的人的環境裡，會比保持特立獨行令人愉悅的
多的多。受限環境中蘊含的機會與每個人都認同你的環境中的機會完全不一樣。我記得當
我們剛剛搬到帕羅奧圖（加州城市）的時候，在第一周裡我心裡一直有一個聲音在和我說
：“這地方很棒，氣候很棒，只需30分鐘就能到達海邊，3小時到滑雪場，30英里遠有一
個充滿生機的城市，還有一個世界上最好的研究型大學走路即可到達。人們真的應該搬到
這裡來。”然後我看了一下房地產價格，這也證明瞭我是對的。但是這種看法顯然不是一
種“與眾不同的觀點”。我的觀點只是一個隻花了一周來觀察的矽谷房非專業地產人員的
觀點，也早已被市場價格所認同了。
To develop truly contrarian views will require a never-ending thirst for
better, more diverse inputs. What player do you think is most undervalued?
Get him for your team. What basketball axiom is most likely to be untrue?
Take it on and do the opposite. What is the biggest, least valuable time sink
for the organization? Stop doing it. Otherwise, it’s a big game of pitty
pat, and you’re stuck just hoping for good things to happen, rather than
developing a strategy for how to make them happen.
發展出真正的與眾不同的觀點，需要對變得更好保持饑渴，以及保持更多樣化的投入
。哪個球員在你看來是最受低估的？把他帶到你的球隊。有什麼籃球公理看起來最不真實
？仔細研究並且按它的反面來執行。組織內部花費了最多時間，卻最沒有效果的事情是什
麼？趕緊停掉。否則，這就是一場大型Pitty Pad（一種卡牌遊戲，看了下介紹有點類似
十三水）遊戲。你會被困住，並且只能被動的期待有一些好事情發生，而不是開發出一套
完整的策略來主動讓好事情發生。
There has to be a willingness to tolerate counterarguments, hopefully in
such a way that you can truly understand and summarize the other side’s
arguments at least as well as they can. And then, after all that, still have
the conviction to separate yourself from the herd.
一定要有意願去容忍抗辯，希望這樣做能夠幫助你完全理解並且總結另一種觀點的論
據，至少能做到和對方理解程度相同。然後，在做到這一切後，仍然要保持對把自己與人
群區分開的信念。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
A tolerance of uncertainty
對不確定的事物保持寬容
This one can be really difficult, especially when the stakes are high. But
it’s critical to making rational decisions over the long term. We are all so
tempted to simplify when something is hard to think about, simply to get it
out of our mind by treating it as impossible.
這一點可能非常難做到，特別是當相關利益非常巨大的時候。但這對於能否做出長期
理性決定來說又至關重要。當一些事情很難找到解決之道的時候，我們總想著去簡化它：
簡單地把它認為是不可能完成的事情，並且不再去思考它。
This goes from academic sounding to life altering in basketball team
building, though. Looking at a player with an estimated 10% or 20% chance of
being a star over the next three or four years can’t be written to zero—that
’s about as high as those odds ever get. That’s surely a very, very high
number for any player that is ever available to you to be added to your team.
Once you accept that, it becomes clear that shrinking the confidence interval
around that estimate (and the estimates of the downside risk at the other end
of the spectrum) becomes pretty darn important.
從學術探究到籃球隊組建，這種情況都會發生。如果一名球員有大約10%或者20%的幾
率能夠在3-4年內變成一位明星球員，這個幾率不應該被簡單地寫為0，雖然事實上這件事
情在真實情況中可能性的確接近於0。這樣一來，有非常非常多的球員都可以被帶到你的
球隊中。一旦你能接受這個觀點，縮小預估的置信區間（以及範圍另一邊的預估值的下行
風險）的重要性就變得顯而易見了。
But our well worn thinking patterns often let us down here. Phil Tetlock,
from just down the street at Penn, addresses this well in his most recent
remarkable book Superforecasting where he quotes the great Amos Tversky
saying, “In dealing with probabilities…most people only have three
settings: “gonna happen,” “not gonna happen,” and “maybe”.” Jeff Van
Gundy sums it up succinctly on our telecasts, “it’s a make or miss league.
” He’s right.
但是我們的思維模式經常讓我們在這裡掉坑裡。菲爾特洛克在他最新的書《超級預測
》中提到過這點。他引用了偉大的阿莫斯特沃斯基的話：“當處理概率的時候，大多數人
只有三種方案，‘會發生’，‘不會發生’，以及‘可能吧’。”傑夫范甘迪在電視廣播
中簡要的總結過：“這就是一個發生或者錯過的聯盟。”他是對的。
In some decisions, the uncertainties are savage. You have to find a way to
get comfortable with that range of outcomes. If you can’t, you’re forced to
live with many fewer options to choose amongst which leads over the long term
to lesser and lesser outcomes.
在一些決定中，不確定性是可怕的。你必須找到一些方法來讓自己對結果的可能性範
圍感到舒適。如果你不能，你會不得不面對一個只有非常少的選項可供選擇的環境。這樣
會導致長期產出越來越少。
The illusion of control is an opiate, though. Nonetheless, it is
annoyingly necessary to get comfortable with many grades of maybe. Sixers
fans come up to me to say hello and many of them say the same thing (almost
instinctively) as we part, “Good luck.” My standard reply: “Thanks. We’ll
need it.”
雖然控制幻覺*是一種精神麻痹物，但是這也是讓自己能夠對各種可能性都感到舒適的
一個必不可少的東西。當76人球迷來和我打招呼時，在我們分開時，他們中大多都會說同
一句話：“祝好運。”我的標準回復是：“謝謝，我們真的需要好運。”
* 控制幻覺是指在完全不可控和部分不可控的情境下，個體由於不合理的高估自己對環境
和事件結果的控制力而產生的一種判斷偏差。摘抄自百度百科。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
Be long science
保持長期科學性
Science is about predictions. Understanding the world until you can make a
prediction about what will happen next. If you’re not sure, test it. Measure
it. Do it again. See if it repeats.
科學主要是為了預測。努力去理解這個世界，直到你能對未來發生的東西做出預測。
如果你對一件事情不確定，那就先做測試。然後做評估，並再次嘗試。看看事情的結果是
否會重複。
“So if we want to think like a scientist more often in life, those are
the three key objectives—to be humbler about what we know, more confident
about what’s possible, and less afraid of things that don’t matter.” That’
s from Tim Urban, who will soon be recognized as one of tomorrow’s polymaths
(like many of you, he lives in New York—I’d recommend meeting him for
coffee sometime).
“如果我們在我們的一生中，想要更多的像科學家一樣進行思考，那有三個主要的目
標——對我們所知的事情保持謙遜；對可能發生的事情保持信心；不要為無關緊要的事情
而擔心。”這是蒂姆厄班，一位被公認的明日博學者所說的（與你們中許多人一樣，他也
住在紐約。我推薦你們能夠有時間找他喝杯咖啡）。
For the Sixers, this has meant efforts like tracking every shot in every
gym where we shoot, making predictions in writing about what we think will
happen with a player or a team, and generally asking more questions about the
game than some are comfortable to have said aloud.
對76人來說，這意味著我們要追蹤每一個球館裡的每一次投籃，把我們針對任何一位
球員或者球隊內可能發生的事情所做的預測記錄下來，並且大量的詢問關於比賽的問題—
—比一些人願意接受的問題數量還要多的問題。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
A healthy respect for tradition
對傳統給與合理的尊重
While contrarian views are absolutely necessary to truly deliver,
conventional wisdom is still wise. It is generally accepted as the
conventional view because it is considered the best we have. Get back on
defense. Share the ball. Box out. Run the lanes. Contest a shot. These things
are real and have been measured, precisely or not, by thousands of men over
decades of trial and error. Hank Iba. Dean Smith. Red Auerbach. Gregg
Popovich. The single best place to start is often wherever they left off.
反向觀點是成功必不可少的一部分，但是傳統的智慧依然是非常重要的。這些觀點被
大量廣泛的接受，也是因為這些觀點已經被認為是我們擁有的最好的觀點。回歸防守，分
享球，卡位，力拼每一球。這些都是實實在在的，並且通過幾十年內被成千上萬的人的試
驗和錯誤評估過的，無論精確的還是不精確的。漢克伊巴，迪恩史密斯，紅衣主教奧爾巴
赫，葛列格波波維奇。最簡單最好的起點往往就是前人留下的經驗。
There are plenty of caricatures of our approach on your behalf, the most
common of which is that folks here don’t even watch the games. That instead
there is some mystical way by which we make decisions that doesn’t have
anything to do with building a basketball team. That’s simply untrue.
現在有大量針對我們的球隊管理方法進行諷刺的漫畫。最通常的內容就是本地市民都
不來看我們的比賽。還有一些人說，我們做的所有決定都無法為建立一個籃球隊給與任何
幫助。這些都是不對的。
Maybe someday the information teams have at their disposal won’t require
scouring the globe watching talented players and teams. That day has not
arrived, and my Marriott Rewards points prove it from all the Courtyards I
sleep in from November to March. There is so much about projecting players
that we still capture best by seeing it in person and sharing (and debating)
those observations with our colleagues. What kind of teammate is he? How does
he play under pressure? How broken is his shot? Can he fight over a screen?
Does he respond to coaching? How hard will he work to improve? And maybe the
key one: will he sacrifice—his minutes, his touches, his shots, his energy,
his body—for the ultimate team game that rewards sacrifice? That
information, as imperfect and subjective as it may be, comes to light most
readily in gyms and by watching an absolute torrent of video.
可能有一天，資訊團隊不再需要在全球範圍尋覓具有天賦的球員和球隊，但是這一天
還沒來到。我的萬豪積分卡內的積分可以證明這一點。瞭解突出的球員的最好的方法，仍
然是通過自己親自觀看，以及與同事之間對觀察所得進行分享（或者討論）。他是什麼了
類型的隊友？他在壓力下打得怎麼樣？他的投射能不能打破防守？他能不能越過障礙？他
聽從教練的指示嗎？他為了進步願意付出多少努力？還有最重要的問題：他是否願意做出
犧牲——對於他的上場時間，他的觸球數，他的出手數，他的體力，他的身材——為了團
隊的終極勝利而犧牲自己的報酬？這些資訊，可能是不完美並主觀的。但是當不斷觀測球
場內的狀況，以及大量的觀看錄影之後，這些資訊會越來越清晰。
Some tradition awaits us everyday at the office. I inherited Marlene
Barnes as my executive assistant, a widowed lifelong Philadelphian that
joined the Sixers in the fall of 1977. I was born in the winter of 1977.
Marlene has worked for 11 different GMs and 5 head coaches at the Sixers. The
names evoke many memories for you lifelong Sixers fans and students of
history like me: Pat Williams, John Nash, Gene Shue, Jim Lynam, John Lucas,
Brad Greenberg, Larry Brown, Billy King, Ed Stefanski, Rod Thorn. With us,
she was immediately thrown into a new, more entrepreneurial work environment
with a boss full of quirks different than any she had ever encountered. She
adapted wonderfully, and now is a regular Slack wizard along with much of our
staff, has seamlessly plugged into one productivity hack after another, and
has ordered more books from Amazon than she ever thought possible. Her
presence served as an everyday reminder to me of the impermanence of my
leadership. I told her within a few weeks of working together that when I see
her in the mornings I’m reminded that I am a steward—today’s steward—of
her Sixers.
一些“傳統”每天都在辦公室裡等著我們。瑪琳巴尼斯是我在76人獲得的行政助理，
她是一個1977年秋季就加入76人的費城本地人。而我在1977年冬天才出生。瑪琳在76人服
務過11位元不同的總經理，以及5任主教練。這些名字會喚起你們這些忠誠的76人球迷以
及像我這樣的歷史的學徒許多回憶：派特威廉姆斯，約翰納什，吉恩舒，吉姆萊納姆，約
翰盧卡斯，布拉德格林伯格，拉裡布朗，比利金，埃德斯蒂芬斯基，羅德索恩。作為她的
新老闆，我和她之前合作過的任何一任老闆都不一樣。與我們一起，她迅速的進入了一種
新的，更像企業的工作環境。她適應的非常好，她現在與我們許多其他同事一樣精通
Slack（一個類似釘釘的軟體），能夠無間隙的在一項工作結束後進入下一項工作，同時
她現在在亞馬遜上購買的書籍遠比她之前所能想像的還要多的多。她的存在對我來說就像
一個日常提醒，讓我認識到我的領導方式是多麼無常。在與她一起工作了幾周之後，我告
訴她，每當我在早上看到她的時候，我都會意識到我只是她的76人的一位乘務員。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
A reverence for disruption
對破壞充滿敬畏
So often a new management regime looks at an organization and decides that
the primary goal is to professionalize the operation. For you, I hope that
doesn’t happen next. As I described to you in our first ever board meeting,
we were fundamentally aiming for something different—disruption. We should
concentrate our efforts in a few key areas in ways others had proven
unwilling. We should attempt to gain a competitive advantage that had a
chance to be lasting, hopefully one unforeseen enough by our competition to
leapfrog them from a seemingly disadvantaged position. A goal that lofty is
anything but certain. And it sure doesn’t come from those that are content
to color within the lines.
通常一個新的管理層會把所謂的專業化的運營看作為球隊最首要的事，然而對於你的
76人而言，我不希望這是接下來會發生的情況。就像我在我們第一次董事會上向你們描述
的一樣，我們本質上的目標就是做一些與眾不同的東西——破壞。我們應該把我們的努力
以一些其他人不願嘗試的方式，集中在一些重要的地方。我們應該努力嘗試去獲得持久的
競爭優勢。希望我們的優勢能出乎競爭對手的意料，讓我們從一個看上去比較劣勢的位置
超越他們。一個崇高的目標絕非固定不變的。並且很明顯，這不是那些滿足於循規蹈矩做
事情的人能獲得的目標。
This is true everywhere, as the balance in any market or any ecosystem
ebbs and flows until something mostly unexpected lurches ahead. We see it in
spades—past, present, and future.
在任何地方這都是真理，任何市場或者經濟體系都存在各種各樣的平衡，直到一些不
被預計到事物突然打破這個平衡，並佔據了領先地位。我們都目睹過這種情況，無論是在
過去，現在，還是未來。
‧ New Zealand’s flightless bird the moa (measuring in at 10 ft, 400
lbs.) had the life tramping around the South Island for a great long run;
then the first Māori explorers washed ashore in canoes, and that was that.
‧ 恐鳥是紐西蘭的一種不能飛的鳥類（3米高，400磅重）。他們一生都處於圍繞紐西
蘭南島的長途旅行中。然後初期的毛利探險家終於通過木筏在成功紐西蘭登錄，然後就沒
有然後了。
‧ I still miss Blackberry’s keyboard, but the 2007 iPhone debut rendered
it nearly obsolete to all but a few of us curmudgeons
‧ 我依然很懷念黑莓手機的鍵盤，但是在2007年iPhone初次放棄了鍵盤之後，實體鍵
盤幾乎就被所有人都放棄了。
‧ Watch what’s happening with the collaboration between IBM’s Watson
and M.D. Anderson or Google DeepMind’s AlphaGo. It won’t be just an ancient
board game that’s disrupted. It’s also anything but a game to Lee Sedol.
‧ 看看IBM的Watson（IBM的AI系統）與M.D. Anderson癌症中心的合作。或者看看穀
歌DeepMind的AlphaGo（阿爾法狗）。這不止關乎於一種被它打亂格局的古老棋盤遊戲。
對於李世石來說，這也不只是一場普通的比賽。
Nobel Prize winning physicist Max Planck got right to it: “A new
scientific truth does not triumph by convincing its opponents and making them
see the light, but rather because its opponents eventually die.” That sounds
harsh, more harsh than anything I would ever say. But think about it in your
context as an equity partner in the Sixers. Every April you will watch 16 of
the 30 teams—the last time that exact configuration of players and coaches
will ever be together—“die” as their season ends. Within a few weeks,
another seven go fishing. By early June, 29 of the 30 opponents are forced to
see the light of the competition’s greatness as only one raises the Larry O’
Brien trophy.
諾貝爾物理學獎獲得者馬克思普朗克說過：“新的科學真理的勝利不是因為說服了它
的對手們，使他們看到了光芒，而是因為它的對手們終於死掉了。”這聽起來很殘酷，比
我說過的任何事情都殘酷。把他代入你們所處的環境裡仔細想一下，作為76人股東合夥人
的環境裡。每年四月你們都會看著30只球隊中的16只因為他們的賽季結束而“死亡”，這
是這支球隊中所有球員以及教練在一起工作的最後時光。幾周之內，另外有7只球隊回家
釣魚。在六月初，30只球隊中的29只被迫看著競爭對手散發出偉大的光芒，因為只有一隻
球隊能夠舉起奧布萊恩獎盃。（譯者：仔細看了下這裡應該是辛基數字弄錯了，事實上四
月是14只球隊死亡，然後幾周後是另外14只球隊去釣魚。）
* * * * * * * * * * * *
我能想到這些中的一些可能聽起來很矛盾：要逆向思維，但是又要尊重傳統，同時又要寄
望於破壞。這就是陰陽之道：保持觀察，保持懷疑。
====================================上下半部分割線
====================================
Investment objectives
投資目標
Starting position
起點
In May of 2013 when I spoke with several of you—and even when we first
met in the summer of 2012—the situation was clear. Your crops had been
eaten. A team that clawed its way to a disappointing 34 wins in 2012-13 had a
few handfuls of those wins walking out the door (Dorell Wright, Nick Young,
Damien Wilkins, Royal Ivey) and a player that drove a bit more who had just
undergone a surgery and was expected to be out for the season (Jason
Richardson). That left the club with expected wins in the low 20s before
replacing anyone. The young players on rookie-scale deals numbered two: Evan
Turner & Arnett Moultrie. Two future first round picks were gone as was the
recent youth pipeline of Nik Vu?evi? & Moe Harkless. Gulp.
當我在2013年5月與你們中的一些人交流的時候，甚至是當我們在2012年夏天第一次見
面的時候，我們所處的環境就很清晰了。球隊的存糧已經被吃完了。一支球隊在用盡各種
方法後，12-13賽季也只取得了令人失望的34場勝利。在那年夏天，許多參與這些勝場的
球員離開了（多雷爾賴特，尼克揚，達米恩威爾金斯，羅伊埃維）;一位貢獻更多的球員
剛剛接受了手術，並且預計會缺席整個賽季（傑生理查森）。在改變陣容之前，這支球隊
新賽季的預計勝場也就在20勝出頭了。新秀合同中的球員有兩位：埃文特納和阿內特莫爾
特里。兩位充滿未來的首輪球員，尼古拉武切維奇和莫哈克利斯之前就被交易走了。可悲
。
Outsiders agreed. ESPN regularly ranks the forward-looking three years for
each team in their Future Power Rankings. They take into account the team’s
current roster and future potential of those players as about half the
rating, then include future draft picks, cap position, coaching, management,
etc. The Sixers near-term future ranked 24th in a 30-team league.
從外界來看，ESPN會預測每支隊未來三年在權力榜中所處的位置。他們會把每支球隊
目前陣容名單以及球員的未來潛力作為評判標準的一部分，然後再加上未來的選秀權、薪
資空間、教練組、管理層等等，來做出最終排名。76人當時在聯盟30支球隊中排名第24位
。
In the press conference announcing my arrival at the Sixers, I said:
在我加入76人的記者招待會上，我說：
* Our challenge was not for the faint of heart. It wasn’t.
* Our challenge was big enough to humble me to think about the enormity
of it. It did.
* 我們的挑戰不適合膽小鬼，絕對不適合。
* 我們的挑戰非常巨大，大到讓我一直思考它到底還能有多大。
We would have to get so very much right.
我們不得不確保我們所做都是正確的。
Goals
目標
The strategy we settled on was straightforward, even if arduous. Replenish
the talent pipeline, improve the quality and quantity of players on the
roster, shift the style of play towards tomorrow’s champions, and become a
culture focused on innovation.
我們設立的戰略都很直截了當，但是完成起來非常艱巨。補充天賦池，增加花名冊中
球員的品質以及數量，把戰術風格像未來的冠軍風格靠攏，並且建立聚焦于創新的文化。
You heard me speak of these goals at each of our quarterly board meetings;
always the same since June of 2013. Variety is overrated.
每個季度的董事會上，你們都會聽到我提這些目標。從13年6月起，每次都一樣。我們
的目標從來沒有改變過。
This continuity of focus has served to frustrate many. I’ve found those
most frustrated are those thateither underestimate the enormity of the
challenge or fundamentally want something else.
持續專注在這個目標上讓很多人感到沮喪。我發現最沮喪的人就是那些低估我們任務
的巨大性的，以及那些本質上只想要一些其他東西的人。
Specifically, we set out to maximize the odds of acquiring star players
using all three available methods of acquiring players (draft, free agency,
and trade).
明確的說，我們為了最大化獲取明星球員，我們用了所有三種可供使用的獲取球員的
方法（選秀，自由簽約，以及交易）：
1. Draft: invest in the deepest pool of star players—young players via
the NBA Draft.
1. 選秀：通過NBA選秀，在最深的球員池——年輕球員中加入投資。
2. Free Agency: maintain financial flexibility to assume contract
liabilities of other teams to acquire picks and prospects and move quickly
toward special opportunities in signings/trade.
2. 自由市場：保持財務狀況的靈活性，以便在需要的時候可以通過為其他球隊承擔
合同，來獲得選秀權以及簽約機會，然後在簽約/交易的特殊機會出現的時候能夠快速的
執行。
3. Trade: gather attractive, improving players to (best case) develop to
win games for the Sixers, or (worst case) trade for better players or players
likely to improve at a faster rate.
3. 交易：保持吸引力，改進球員名單。最好的情況下就是説明他們成長，以增加球
隊贏球能力。最壞的情況就是把這些球員再去交易一些更好的球員，或者更可能高速成長
的球員。
We determined to play a faster style that recognizes the importance of
speed in tomorrow’s NBA and one that quickly integrates young players. We
set out to improve our shot selection toward high efficiency basketball. We
also wanted to build a defensive identity that—in time—could thwart tomorrow
’s high-efficiency offenses. Lastly, we needed to build a world-class
training center, develop an ever-evolving player development program, and
change the organization’s culture to one of innovation and a constant search
for competitive edge.
未來NBA的運作速度會非常快，因此我們堅決以一種更快速的風格來運作。我們會快速
的整合年輕球員。我們會把我們的目標設定在建立一個高效率籃球體系上面。我們同樣希
望建立一個足以應對未來高效籃球進攻體系的防守體系。最終，我們需要建立一個世界一
流的訓練中心，開發一套時刻進化的球員發展體系，改變組織文化：保持創新，以及為了
競爭性優勢不懈探索。
These goals were not to fit some preferred style of play, but instead were
aiming for where future champions would be crowned. That original document I
gave to Josh and David in 2012 said:
這些目標不適合一些著眼當下的運作模式，與之相反，這些目標旨在在未來獲得冠軍
。我在2012年給約什和大衛的原始文檔中說過：
History’s lessons are clear, but tomorrow’s championship caliber teams
may break from historical trends:
歷史上的成功模式可能看起來非常簡單，但是未來的冠軍球隊可能會完全破壞歷史趨
勢：
* Example: A 3PA-happy champion like Orlando under Stan Van Gundy
* Example: A fast-paced champion like Phoenix under Mike D’Antoni
* 例如：像斯坦范甘迪麾下的奧蘭多魔術那樣熱愛三分的球隊
* 例如：像麥克德安東尼麾下的費尼克斯太陽那樣熱愛快節奏的球隊
Fast forward three years and Golden State made the 3rd most 3s in NBA
history to win the Finals against the Cleveland Cavaliers, who made the 8th
most 3s in NBA history. Coach Van Gundy’s most 3PAhappy team from Orlando
proudly sits smack dab between them in 5th place all time (for now). The
Warriors did this in part by playing at the fastest pace of any NBA team last
season, considerably faster than Coach D’Antoni’s fastest Suns team.
在那之後三年，總決賽對陣雙方是金州勇士和克利夫蘭騎士。前者投進總決賽歷史上
第三多的三分球，後者投進總決賽歷史上第八多的三分球。范甘迪教練的魔術隊正好在他
們之中，投進總決賽歷史第五多的三分球。同時，勇士是在一種比上賽季任何球隊都要快
速的節奏中完成上述成就的，甚至比德安東尼教練的太陽還要快。
Results
結果
The dozen of you know much about our team, our players, and how we’re
positioned. I won’t waste your time by going through each person in detail,
as you have had many opportunities to meet our coaches and players, hear
about our talented staff, and see their performance dissected and analyzed in
our meetings. Instead, I will try to make the best use of your time by
sharing some insight into the inner workings behind the scenes and a few
details that aren’t appropriate for wider consumption.
你們都對我們的球隊，我們的球員，和我們所處的位置都有很深的瞭解。你們有很多
機會來和我們的教練組以及球員做面對面的溝通，聽聽我們充滿天賦的員工的想法，並且
在會議上看看他們的分析報告。因此我不會浪費你們的時間來逐一介紹每一位球員。相反
，我會試著去最大化利用你們的時間，來與你們分享一些我在幕後所看到的觀點，其中有
一些細節還從未被廣泛的傳開過。
Players
球員
It is worth noting that over the long term, basketball teambuilding is
about one primary thing—the players. Those players the team has on the
roster at the time and those they hold the rights to. Plus those that are to
follow. All of the operations, from management to coaches to support staff to
systems only exist for one reason—the players.
從長遠來看，最值得投入關注的就是球員，這是組建一個籃球隊中最重要的資產。包
括了當下在名單上的球員，擁有簽約權的球員，以及那些正處於觀察期的球員。一支球隊
所有的運營，從管理層到教練組，從支援人員到整個系統，都是為了一個目標存在的：球
員。
We have had the good fortune of drafting relatively early, giving us
access to some especially talented players, including Jahlil Okafor (#3),
Joel Embiid (#3), and Nerlens Noel (#6). Many in our office tried to set a
line of when Jahlil would see his first double team in this league. Those
with the under looked smart by the end of opening night, where he went for 26
points and 7 rebounds.
我們運氣很好，能夠獲得相對靠前的選秀權。通過這些選秀權，我們有機會去獲取一
些特別有天賦的球員，包括了賈利爾奧卡福（第三順位），喬爾恩比德（第三順位），和
諾倫斯諾爾（第六順位）。當奧卡福面臨職業生涯中第一次包夾的時候，我們辦公室裡的
很多人都很緊張。最後當那場揭幕戰結束的時候，奧卡福砍下了26分以及7個籃板。
We also put ourselves into position to draft in the second round, where we
found two 22-year-old gems to date, including Jerami Grant (#39) and Richaun
Holmes (#37). Outside of the top 60 selections delivered two more players
with real NBA futures in 24-year-old T.J. McConnell and 25-year-old Robert
Covington.
我們在第二輪選擇了兩位優秀的球員，傑拉米格蘭特（39順位）以及裡喬恩霍姆斯（
37順位）。他們都只有22歲，都是還未被開發的寶石。在60個選秀球員之外，我們還獲得
了兩位符合NBA未來的球員：24歲的T.J.麥克康奈爾，和25歲的羅伯特科文頓。
Robert is a mistake I rubbed my own nose in for over a year. The 2013
Draft was a flurry of activity for us—a handful of trades and selections in
both the first and second rounds. We had more action following the draft as
we tried to finalize our summer league team and get the myriad trade calls
set up with the NBA. I could see this coming a few days before and we
informed the media that this kind of approach might lead to an unusually late
start for the post-draft press conference. Several of you were still there
late that night. At about 1:00 a.m. I went downstairs to address an equally
exhausted media on deadline from their editors. When I returned upstairs, the
undrafted Robert Covington was gone, having agreed to play for another club’
s summer league team, eventually making their regular season roster. He
torched the D-League that year, haunting me all the while. When he became
available 17 months later, we pounced. But I shudder, even now, at that
(nearly) missed opportunity.
科文頓是一位讓我懊惱了一整年的球員。2013年選秀中，我們非常慌忙：需要在第一
輪第二輪都做出一些交易以及選擇。在選秀之後，我們又有很多事情要做，我們試著確認
我們的夏季聯賽陣型，並且接到了無數詢問交易的電話。在幾天前我就能預見到這些事情
的發生，同時我們也告知過媒體，這些事情隨時可能會讓選秀之後的記者招待會延誤。那
天你們中的一些人一直呆到了很晚才走。在大約淩晨1點的時候，我不得不下樓去應付一
位元已經筋疲力盡的記者。等到我再次上樓的時候，落選秀羅伯特科文頓已經走了，他已
經答應了代表另外一家球隊參加夏季聯賽，並最終進入了他們的最終常規賽名單。那一年
他點燃了發展聯盟，並讓我一直念念不忘。當17個月後，他終於成為自由球員的時候，我
們出擊了。但是我仍然很後怕，即便是現在都很害怕，我怕我們會錯過如此之好的機會。
Even our efforts to support our players serve as a reminder of the
enormity of our challenge. Something important to us is to find ways to be
supportive to our players' larger extended families and loved ones that take
this journey with them. One group, too casually referred to as "the wives
club" at many NBA teams, helps support players' families in getting
acclimated to the city by handling tickets for loved ones, volunteering in
community events, hosting baby showers, and the like. In 2013 my wife and I
arrived at the arena one night to host a few from this group. While I was
prepared to highlight for the group the team’s family room, child care at
the arena, etc., it turned out that our attendance at this event totaled two.
Two mothers. It was a pointed reminder of just how young our team was.
就連我們為球員所做的後勤工作，都是我們挑戰的艱巨性的一種體現。對我們來說，
找到能夠支持球員逐漸擴大的家庭，以及他們所愛之人的方法也非常重要。許多球隊都有
類似“夫人俱樂部”一樣的組織，她們會説明球員的家庭成員來熟悉城市，她們會為球員
所愛之人處理票務，在社區活動上做志願者，組織新生寶寶受禮日等等。在2013年的一個
晚上，我和我的妻子來到球場，想要招待這群人中的一部分。當我準備向她們展示我們的
球館內的家庭活動室以及母嬰室的時候，我發現我們的聽眾只有兩位：兩位母親。這件事
情再次提醒了我我們的球隊是多麼的年輕。
This story underscores what our players, particularly our best players,
are in greatest need of—time. The gap between driving wins today and driving
wins tomorrow will be heavily influenced by a bunch of factors, but the
biggest one is time. For players like Jahlil, Nerlens, and Jerami, getting
much nearer the middle of their new NBA cohort will go a long way toward
letting their talents shine through, just as it has their whole basketball
lives when they were nearer the middle of those cohorts. Get down the
experience curve, the faster the better. They are 20, 21, and 22 years old.
這個故事也揭示了我們的球員，特別是我們最好的球員，目前最需要的東西就是時間
。贏在當下與贏在未來之間有一條鴻溝，這條鴻溝會被許多因素影響，但其中最大的因素
就是時間。對於像奧卡福，諾爾，以及格蘭特等球員來說，只有當