作者:
kwei (光影)
2019-12-02 10:18:29America’s War on Chinese Technology
美國的反中國科技戰
原文：Project Syndicat - https://tinyurl.com/umjqsh8
作者：Jeffrey Sachs
哥倫比亞大學管理學教授
譯文：聯合早報 - http://www.uzbcn.com/mon/keji/20191130/64519.html
The worst foreign-policy decision by the United States of the last generation
– and perhaps longer – was the “war of choice” that it launched in Iraq
in 2003 for the stated purpose of eliminating weapons of mass destruction
that did not, in fact, exist. Understanding the illogic behind that
disastrous decision has never been more relevant, because it is being used to
justify a similarly misguided US policy today.
美國上一代人，甚至包括更前幾代人所做出的最糟糕外交政策決定，是2003年對伊拉克發
動的“選擇之戰”（war of choice），其所宣稱的目的是消除實際上並不存在的大規模
殺傷性武器。理解這一災難性決策背後的錯誤邏輯，從未像現在這樣重要，因為同樣的邏
輯正被用來為美國當下類似的誤導性政策辯護。
The decision to invade Iraq followed the illogic of then-US Vice President
Richard Cheney, who declared that even if the risk of WMDs falling into
terrorist hands was tiny – say, 1% – we should act as if that scenario
would certainly occur.
入侵伊拉克的決定是在時任美國副總統錢尼（Richard Cheney）的錯誤邏輯下做出的。他
聲稱，即便大規模殺傷性武器落入恐怖分子之手的風險很小（比如1%），我們也應該將這
種情況當作肯定會發生，並據此採取行動。
Such reasoning is guaranteed to lead to wrong decisions more often than not.
Yet the US and some of its allies are now using the Cheney Doctrine to attack
Chinese technology. The US government argues that because we can’t know with
certainty that Chinese technologies are safe, we should act as if they are
certainly dangerous and bar them.
這種推理方式往往會導致錯誤的決策。然而，美國及其一些盟國現正利用“錢尼主義”（
Cheney Doctrine）來攻擊中國科技。按照美國政府的說法，既然我們無法確切地知道中
國科技是安全的，我們應該把它們當作必然有害那樣去應對，並予以封殺。
Proper decision-making applies probability estimates to alternative actions.
A generation ago, US policymakers should have considered not only the
(alleged) 1% risk of WMDs falling into terrorist hands, but also the 99% risk
of a war based on flawed premises. By focusing only on the 1% risk, Cheney
(and many others) distracted the public’s attention from the much greater
likelihood that the Iraq War lacked justification and that it would gravely
destabilize the Middle East and global politics.
正確的決策會將概率估計應用於各項替代的行動。一代人以前，美國的政策制定者不僅應
該考慮大規模殺傷性武器落入恐怖分子之手的所謂1%風險，還應考慮基於多個有缺陷的前
提發動一場戰爭的99%風險。錢尼以及其他許多人只關注1%的風險，從而分散了公眾的注
意力，使人們忽略了一個更大的可能性：伊拉克戰爭缺乏正當理由，而且會嚴重破壞中東
和全球政治的穩定。
The problem with the Cheney Doctrine is not only that it dictates taking
actions predicated on small risks without considering the potentially very
high costs. Politicians are tempted to whip up fears for ulterior purposes.
錢尼主義的問題不僅在於它單憑微小的風險就決定採取行動，卻未考慮極高的潛在成本，
還在於政客會為了不可告人的目的而想要煽動恐懼。
That is what US leaders are doing again: creating a panic over Chinese
technology companies by raising, and exaggerating, tiny risks. The most
pertinent case (but not the only one) is the US government attack on the
wireless broadband company Huawei. The US is closing its markets to the
company and trying hard to shut down its business around the world. As with
Iraq, the US could end up creating a geopolitical disaster for no reason.
這就是美國領導人又一次在做的事情：通過指出和誇大一些微小風險，來激起對中國科技
企業的恐慌。與此最為相關（但不是唯一）的案例，是美國政府對通信科技企業華為的攻
擊。美國正在逐步對該公司關閉其國內市場，並努力扼殺其全球業務。與伊拉克一樣，美
國可能最終會造成一場毫無來由的地緣政治災難。
I have followed Huawei’s technological advances and work in developing
countries, as I believe that 5G and other digital technologies offer a huge
boost to ending poverty and other SDGs. I have similarly interacted with
other telecoms companies and encouraged the industry to step up actions for
the SDGs. When I wrote a short foreword (without compensation) for a Huawei
report on the topic, and was criticized by foes of China, I asked top
industry and government officials for evidence of wayward activities by
Huawei. I heard repeatedly that Huawei behaves no differently than trusted
industry leaders.
我在發展中國家工作過，也一直在關注華為所取得的技術進步，因為我相信5G以及其他數
碼科技能為消除貧困，以及其他聯合國可持續發展目標的實現提供巨大推動力。我也與其
他電信企業進行了類似的互動，並鼓勵業界加強針對可持續發展目標的行動。當我無償地
為華為圍繞該主題所做的一份報告撰寫了一篇簡短前言，而遭到敵視中國者的批評時，我
向行業高層和政府官員詢問，是否有證據證明華為有任何出格行為，而反覆得到的答案是
華為的操行，與其他值得信賴的行業領導者別無二致。
The US government nonetheless argues that Huawei’s 5G equipment could
undermine global security. A “backdoor” in Huawei’s software or hardware,
US officials claim, could enable the Chinese government to engage in
surveillance around the world. After all, US officials note, China’s laws
require Chinese companies to cooperate with the government for purposes of
national security.
儘管如此，美國政府仍認為華為的5G設備可能損害全球安全。美國官員聲稱，華為軟件或
硬件所保留的“後門”，可能使中國政府能夠在全球範圍內進行監視。他們指出，畢竟中
國的法律要求中國企業出於國家安全理由與政府合作。
Now, the facts are these. Huawei’s 5G equipment is low cost and high
quality, currently ahead of many competitors, and already rolling out. Its
high performance results from years of substantial spending on research and
development, scale economies, and learning by doing in the Chinese digital
marketplace. Given the technology’s importance for their sustainable
development, low-income economies around the world would be foolhardy to
reject an early 5G rollout.
但是，事實擺在眼前。華為的5G設備價格低廉，品質優良，目前領先於許多競爭對手並且
已經開始推廣。它的高性能源自多年來在研發上的巨額投入、規模經濟效應，以及在中國
數碼市場上的摸爬滾打。考慮到該技術對其可持續發展的重要性，世界各地的低收入經濟
體如果拒絕早日推出5G，就顯然太過不智了。
Yet, despite providing no evidence of backdoors, the US is telling the world
to stay away from Huawei. The US claims are generic. As a US Federal
Communications Commissioner put it, “The country that owns 5G will own
innovations and set the standards for the rest of the world and that country
is currently not likely to be the United States.” Other countries, most
notably the United Kingdom, have found no backdoors in Huawei’s hardware and
software. Even if backdoors were discovered later, they could almost surely
be closed at that point.
然而，儘管拿不出任何後門存在的證據，但美國仍在遊說世界遠離華為。美國的說法是普
適性的。正如一名美國聯邦通信委員會官員所言：“擁有5G的國家，將擁有相關創新並為
世界其他地區設定標準，而這個國家目前不太可能是美國。”其他國家，尤其是英國尚未
在華為的軟硬件中找到任何後門。即便將來發現後門，也幾乎肯定可以在那時將其關閉。
The debate over Huawei rages in Germany, where the US government threatens to
curtail intelligence cooperation unless the authorities exclude Huawei’s 5G
technology. Perhaps as a result of the US pressure, Germany’s spy chief
recently made a claim tantamount to the Cheney Doctrine: “Infrastructure is
not a suitable area for a group that cannot be trusted fully.” He offered no
evidence of specific misdeeds. Chancellor Angela Merkel, by contrast, is
fighting behind the scenes to leave the market open for Huawei.
關於華為的辯論在德國也甚囂塵上，因為美國政府威脅，除非當局將華為的5G技術擋在門
外，否則要減少情報合作。或許是迫於美國的壓力，德國聯邦情報局局長卡爾最近發表了
一個類似錢尼主義的聲明：“基礎設施不是一個適合讓一個無法被完全信任的群體涉足的
領域。”而他也沒能拿出任何具體罪行的證據。相比之下，總理默克爾則在幕後爭取為華
為開放市場。
Ironically, though predictably, the US complaints partly reflect America’s
own surveillance activities at home and abroad. Chinese equipment might make
secret surveillance by the US government more difficult. But unwarranted
surveillance by any government should be ended. Independent United Nations
monitoring to curtail such activities should become part of the global
telecoms system. In short, we should choose diplomacy and institutional
safeguards, not a technology war.
然而，諷刺的是，美國的抱怨其實部分反映了美國自己在國內外的監視活動，雖然這早已
不是新聞。中國設備可能會使美國政府更加難以進行秘密監視。但是，任何政府的非正當
監視行為都應該停止。聯合國為減少此類活動而進行的獨立監督，應成為全球電信體系的
一部分。簡而言之，我們應該選擇外交和體制保障，而不是去打科技戰。
The threat of US demands to blockade Huawei concerns more than the early
rollout of the 5G network. The risks to the rules-based trading system are
profound. Now that the US is no longer the world’s undisputed technology
leader, US President Donald Trump and his advisers don’t want to compete
according to a rules-based system. Their goal is to contain China’s
technological rise. Their simultaneous attempt to neutralize the World Trade
Organization by disabling its dispute settlement system shows the same
disdain for global rules.
美國要求封殺華為的威脅，並不僅僅關係到5G網絡的早日推出，也對基於規則的交易系統
造成巨大的風險。如今美國已不再是全球無可爭議的技術領導者，美國總統川普和他的顧
問都不想按照基於規則的體系去展開競爭，他們的目標是遏制中國的技術性崛起。他們同
時還試圖通過癱瘓世界貿易組織的爭端解決機制來抹殺該組織，而此舉同樣體現出他們對
全球規則的漠視。
If the Trump administration “succeeds” in dividing the world into separate
technology camps, the risks of future conflicts will multiply. The US
championed open trade after World War II not only to boost global efficiency
and expand markets for American technology, but also to reverse the collapse
of international trade in the 1930s. That collapse stemmed in part from
protectionist tariffs imposed by the US under the 1930 Smoot-Hawley Act,
which amplified the Great Depression, in turn contributing to the rise of
Hitler and, ultimately, the outbreak of World War II.
如果川普政府能“成功”將世界分割為不同的技術陣營，則未來爆發衝突的風險將成倍增
加。二戰後美國推崇開放貿易，不僅是為了提高全球效率，擴大美國技術市場，也為了扭
轉1930年代國際貿易的崩潰狀態。該次崩潰的部分原因則是美國根據1930年《斯姆特－霍
利法案》（Smoot-Hawley Act）徵收的保護主義關稅，該關稅加劇了大蕭條，進而促成了
希特勒的崛起，並最終推動了第二次世界大戰的爆發。
In international affairs, no less than in other domains, stoking fears and
acting on them, rather than on the evidence, is the path to ruin. Let’s
stick to rationality, evidence, and rules as the safest course of action. And
let us create independent monitors to curtail the threat of any country using
global networks for surveillance of or cyberwarfare on others. That way, the
world can get on with the urgent task of harnessing breakthrough digital
technologies for the global good.
正如其他領域一樣，在國際事務領域激發恐懼並藉以採取行動，而不是遵循證據行事，是
條邁向毀滅之路。讓我們堅持理性、證據和規則，這是最安全的做法。讓我們設立獨立監
控機構，以減少任何國家利用全球網絡監視其他國家或發動網絡戰的威脅。這樣一來，世
界就可以趕緊利用突破性數碼科技來促進全球福祉。