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作者：
傅泰林M. Taylor Fravel(知名中國問題專家)
史文Michael Swaine(知名中國問題專家)
芮效儉J. Stapleton Roy(前美國駐中國大使)
董雲裳Susan Thorton(前國務院亞太事務代理助卿)
傅高義Ezra Feivel Vogel(知名亞洲議題專家)
Dear President Trump and members of Congress:
親愛的川普總統與美國國會議員：
We are members of the scholarly, foreign policy, military and business
community, overwhelmingly from the United States, including many who have
focused on Asia throughout our professional careers. We are deeply concerned
about the growing deterioration in U.S. relations with China, which we
believe does not serve American or global interests. Although we are very
troubled by Beijing’s recent behavior, which requires a strong response, we
also believe that many U.S. actions are contributing directly to the downward
spiral in relations.
我們是一群來自學術界、外交界、軍事界及商業界的成員，絕大多數來自美國，
包括許多在自己的職業生涯中長期關注亞洲議題的從業人員。
我們深深關切惡化中的中美關係，並認為這不符合美國及全球的利益。
雖然我們對於北京近期的作為感到困擾，認為需要予以強力回應，
我們依然相信許多美國的應對作為，直接使中美關係陷入往下的漩渦。
The following seven propositions represent our collective views on China, the
problems in the U.S. approach to China and the basic elements of a more
effective U.S. policy. Our institutional affiliations are provided for
identification purposes only.
以下的七點建議，代表我們對中國的共同觀點、對美國與中方交涉途徑的問題點，
以及如何讓美國對華政策更有效果的基本元素。至於列出我們曾或正在職的機構，
只是為了方便讀者辨識我們的身份而已。
1. China’s troubling behavior in recent years — including its turn toward
greater domestic repression, increased state control over private firms,
failure to live up to several of its trade commitments, greater efforts to
control foreign opinion and more aggressive foreign policy — raises serious
challenges for the rest of the world. These challenges require a firm and
effective U.S. response, but the current approach to China is fundamentally
counterproductive.
第一，中國近年來令人困擾的行為，包括加強內部鎮壓、國家對私人企業的管制、
無法履行若干貿易承諾、加強對外國意見的管制，以及更有侵略性的外交政策等，
對世界各國造成了嚴肅的挑戰。而這些挑戰，需要美國有力且有效的回應，
但美國最近對華政策的途徑在根本上就是反效果。
2. We do not believe that Beijing is an economic enemy or an existential
national security threat that must be confronted in every sphere; nor is
China a monolith, or the views of its leaders set in stone. Although its
rapid economic and military growth has led Beijing toward a more assertive
international role, many Chinese officials and other elites know that a
moderate, pragmatic and genuinely cooperative approach with the West serves
China’s interests. Washington’s adversarial stance toward Beijing weakens
the influence of those voices in favor of assertive nationalists. With the
right balance of competition and cooperation, U.S. actions can strengthen
those Chinese leaders who want China to play a constructive role in world
affairs.
我們不相信北京是美國的經濟敵人，或是本質上的國安威脅，需要美國全方位的圍堵。
我們也不相信中國是一大塊頑石，或其領導階層的觀點是僵化無法改變的。
雖然中國快速的經濟與軍事成長促使北京當局想成為更堅定自信的國際事務要角，
許多中國官員及其他菁英明瞭一個溫和、務實與西方真誠合作的途徑符合其利益。
華府方面對北京的敵意立場只會削弱這些菁英的影響力，使民族主義死硬派得利。
若能維持競爭與合作的平衡，美國的行動可以增加這些希望中國在世界事務上扮演更
有建設性角色的中國領袖的底氣。
3. U.S. efforts to treat China as an enemy and decouple it from the global
economy will damage the United States’ international role and reputation and
undermine the economic interests of all nations. U.S. opposition will not
prevent the continued expansion of the Chinese economy, a greater global
market share for Chinese companies and an increase in China’s role in world
affairs. Moreover, the United States cannot significantly slow China’s rise
without damaging itself. If the United States presses its allies to treat
China as an economic and political enemy, it will weaken its relations with
those allies and could end up isolating itself rather than Beijing.
美國試圖把中國視為敵人、剝奪其在全球經濟上的立足點，只會傷害美國的全球角色、
聲譽，並損及所有國家的經濟利益。美國的反對無法阻止中國經濟的持續擴張、無法
阻止中國企業在世界市場的占比，也無法限制中國在全球事務上的角色。
此外，美國無法在不傷害自己的情況下，顯著減緩中國的崛起。
如果美方壓迫其盟邦將中國視為共同的經濟與政治敵人，將損及與盟邦的關係，
甚至只會使自己、而不是北京，陷入孤立。
4. The fear that Beijing will replace the United States as the global leader
is exaggerated. Most other countries have no interest in such an outcome, and
it is not clear that Beijing itself sees this goal as necessary or feasible.
Moreover, a government intent on limiting the information and opportunities
available to its own citizens and harshly repressing its ethnic minorities
will not garner meaningful international support nor succeed in attracting
global talent. The best American response to these practices is to work with
our allies and partners to create a more open and prosperous world in which
China is offered the opportunity to participate. Efforts to isolate China
will simply weaken those Chinese intent on developing a more humane and
tolerant society.
認為北京將取代美國成為全球領袖的恐懼是被誇大的。
多數國家不會從這樣的結果得利，也沒有明證顯示北京視此目標為必要或可行的。
此外，一個意圖限制其公民獲取資訊與機會、激烈壓制少數族群的政府，
不會獲得實質意義上的國際支持，也無法吸引全球人才投靠。
美國對這些作為最好的回應方式，是與盟邦及伙伴合作，創造一個更開放與繁榮的世界，
使中國有機會參與其中。試圖孤立中國，只會弱化中國發展更人性與寬容社會的努力。
5. Although China has set a goal of becoming a world-class military by
mid-century, it faces immense hurdles to operating as a globally dominant
military power. However, Beijing’s growing military capabilities have
already eroded the United States’ long-standing military preeminence in the
Western Pacific. The best way to respond to this is not to engage in an
open-ended arms race centered on offensive, deep-strike weapons and the
virtually impossible goal of reasserting full-spectrum U.S. dominance up to
China’s borders. A wiser policy is to work with allies to maintain
deterrence, emphasizing defensive-oriented, area denial capabilities,
resiliency and the ability to frustrate attacks on U.S. or allied territory,
while strengthening crisis-management efforts with Beijing.
雖然中國已經設下在本世紀中成為世界級軍事強權的目標，
它很難以一個在全球取得宰制地位的軍事強權的身份來運作。
然而，北京逐漸成長的軍力確實已侵蝕美國長期在西太平洋的軍力優勢。
最好的回應方式不是與中國陷入無止境的軍事競賽，集中力量於中國國境周邊，
建構一個攻勢性、深度攻擊式、在所有面向上都絕對優於中國的美軍優勢。
更聰明的政策是與盟邦合作，維持對中國的嚇阻力量，強調防衛導向、區域拒止能力、
韌性與挫敗中方對美國及其盟邦領土發動攻擊的能力，
同時強化中美共同管控危機的能力。
6. Beijing is seeking to weaken the role of Western democratic norms within
the global order. But it is not seeking to overturn vital economic and other
components of that order from which China itself has benefited for decades.
Indeed, China’s engagement in the international system is essential to the
system’s survival and to effective action on common problems such as climate
change. The United States should encourage Chinese participation in new or
modified global regimes in which rising powers have a greater voice. A
zero-sum approach to China’s role would only encourage Beijing to either
disengage from the system or sponsor a divided global order that would be
damaging to Western interests.
北京正試圖弱化西方民主政體在全球秩序下的角色。
但它並沒有試圖扭轉這個秩序下，使其自身在過去數十年獲益的經濟及其他元素。
確實，中國參與國際體系的方式關係此一體系的生存，也關乎共同應對世界共同問題
(如氣候變遷)的有效與否。美國應該鼓勵中國參與全新或修改過後的國際制度，
使崛起中的強權能有更多的發言權。對中國國際角色的零合競爭態度，
只會鼓勵北京當局或脫離此一系統，或資助另一套分立的世界秩序，損及西方的利益。
7. In conclusion, a successful U.S. approach to China must focus on creating
enduring coalitions with other countries in support of economic and security
objectives. It must be based on a realistic appraisal of Chinese perceptions,
interests, goals and behavior; an accurate match of U.S. and allied resources
with policy goals and interests; and a rededication of U.S. efforts to
strengthen its own capacity to serve as a model for others. Ultimately, the
United States’ interests are best served by restoring its ability to compete
effectively in a changing world and by working alongside other nations and
international organizations rather than by promoting a counterproductive
effort to undermine and contain China’s engagement with the world.
總而言之，一套成功的美國對華政策，必須專注於創造與其他國家的持久合作關係，
來達成美國設定的經濟與安全目標。這套政策必須基於美國與盟邦資源對政策目標與
國家利益的準確投入，以及美國再度努力提昇自己做為全球模範的嘗試。
終極而論，美國恢復自身在一個變化萬千世界中有效與他國競爭的能力，
同時與他國及國際組織共同努力，而非提倡一套損傷中國參與世界事務的反效果計畫，
更符合美國的利益。
We believe that the large number of signers of this open letter clearly
indicates that there is no single Washington consensus endorsing an overall
adversarial stance toward China, as some believe exists.
我們相信，大多數簽署此封公開信的成員，清楚指出：
沒有一個名為「華府共識」、意圖全面對抗中國的共同立場存在於世，
但有少部分成員相信此一共識確實存在。
簽署成員(只列出最有名者)：
Jeffrey Bader-前國安會東亞事務資深主任
Jerome Cohen(孔傑榮)-國際法大師、馬英九的老師
Jan Berris-中美關係全國委員會副會長
Ian Bremmer-歐亞集團總裁
Richard Bush(卜睿哲)-不用解釋了吧
Robert Einhorn-前助理國務卿
Thomas Fingar(馮稼時)-前副國家情報總監
John Gannon-前國家情報委員會主席
Steven M. Goldstein-哈佛大學台灣工作坊主任
Philip H. Gordon-前總統特別助理、助理國務卿
Robert O. Keohane-普林斯頓大學政治學宗師
David M. Lampton-美國中國研究宗師、中美關係全國委員會前會長
Kenneth Lieberthal-前國安會亞洲事務資深主任
John McLaughlin-前CIA代理局長
Michael Nacht-前國防部助理部長
Joseph Nye-「軟實力」大師、前國防部助理部長、前國家情報委員會主席
Stephen A. Orlins-中美關係全國委員會現任會長
Douglas Paal(包道格)-不用解釋了吧
Thomas Pickering-前國務次卿、美國駐聯合國大使
Shelley Rigger(任雪麗)-美國台灣議題專家
Charles S. Robb-前美國聯邦參議院外交委員會亞太小組主席
David Shear(施大衛)-前國防部助理部長
James Steinberg-前國務次卿
Michael Szonyi(宋怡明)-哈佛大學費正清中心主任，接待過韓國瑜
Strobe Talbott-前國防部副部長