1.媒體來源:
The National Interest
（美）國家利益
2.記者署名:
Brian Clark
3.完整新聞標題:
America Needs to Rethink How It Is Handling China’s Rise
美国有必要重新考虑其如何应对中国的崛起
4.完整新聞內文:
China’s rise into a major world power has been nothing short of
extraordinary. Since adopting liberal economic reforms in the early
seventies, China’s economy has grown approximately ten percent per year, its
life expectancy has gone up by 50 percent, and nearly all war games now
predict that Beijing would win if conflict broke out in Asia.
中國崛起為主要的世界力量是非凡的事件。自上世紀70年代末改革開放以來，中國經濟年均增長約10%，國民預期壽命提高了50%，而且現在幾乎所有的戰爭推演都預測，如果亞洲爆發沖突，北京將獲勝。
China’s rise was expected. America not only supported it but was also a key
participant. America supplied a stable reserve currency, invested large
amounts of capital in its economy, and provided Beijing with its largest
export market, all of which were crucial for China’s rapid transformation.
中國的崛起是意料之中的。美國不僅支持，還是一個關鍵的參與者。美國提供了穩定的儲
備貨幣，大量投資於中國經濟，並為北京提供了最大的出口市場，這些都對中國的快速轉
型至關重要。
This arrangement was never one-sided, however, as America benefitted too; one
piece of analysis, for example, argues that approximately 2.6 million
American jobs are supported by Chinese-American trade.
然而，這種關系從來都不是單向的，因為美國也從中受益；有分析認為，中美貿易為大約
260萬個美國就業機會提供支持。
Yet, while the economies of both countries benefited, China’s rapid growth
created the dilemma known as the Thucydides Trap, which is “the severe
structural stress caused when a rising power threatens to upend a ruling one.
” This tension has historically laid the groundwork for a minor incident to
result in a major war, such as the assassination of archduke Franz Ferdinand
leading to World War I.
兩國經濟受益的同時，中國的快速增長也造成了所謂“修昔底德陷阱”的困局，也即“當
一個崛起中的力量試圖挑戰現有的統治力量時，會出現結構性緊張”。這種緊張往往演變
為小沖突或導致戰爭。例如對Franz Ferdinand大公的刺殺導致第一次世界大戰的爆發。
America was always aware of this dilemma, and in response employed a strategy
of “Congagement,” which was a mixture of military containment and economic
engagement. The assumption was that China would not seek to overturn the
current order if it was allowed to become a responsible stakeholder of the
current one.
美國向來清楚這種困局，並采取了“遏制加接觸”戰略，即軍事遏制和經濟接觸相結合。
這種戰略的前提是，如果允許中國成為當前秩序的一個負責任的利益相關者，它就不會尋
求推翻當前的秩序。
At the time this seemed like a good policy. China was invited to join an
order that was described as rule-bound and highly cooperative, which was “
hard to overturn and easy to join.” As others have noted elsewhere, it was
arguably China that benefited the most from this order, as it allowed it to
raise eight hundred million of its citizens from poverty while also keeping
Japan, a historical rival, militarily weak and unthreatening.
當時看來，這似乎是一個好政策。中國從這個秩序中獲益多多，它使中國8億人擺脫了貧
困，同時也使日本這個歷史上中國的對手在軍事上保持弱勢，不具威脅性。
But after thirty-plus years of bipartisan support, it is now widely
acknowledged that this strategy has failed, as Beijing not only rejected the
invitation to fully integrate but is currently pursuing an alternative order.
Included are economic institutions that rival those of the Bretton Woods
System, such as the Belt and Road Initiative, the Asian Infrastructure
Investment Bank, and the New Development Bank. Also included is a new
security order where China replaces America as the region’s dominant
military power.
　該戰略得到了美國兩黨30多年的支持，而現在的共識是它已失敗，因為北京正在追求另
一種秩序。其中包括與布雷頓森林體系相抗衡的經濟機構，如 “一帶一路”倡議、亞洲
基礎設施投資銀行和新開發銀行。另外，中國正在取代美國成為所在區域的統治性軍事力
量。
America’s response has been to blame China, arguing that an illiberal regime
would have never fully bought into a liberal system, no matter how much it
may have benefited from it in the past. The new American consensus now argues
for a more combative stance towards China’s rise, which includes decoupling
their economies, strengthening America’s regional deterrence, and shoring up
American allies.
美國的反應是指責中國。現在，美國的新共識主張對中國崛起采取更強硬的立場，其中包
括兩國經濟脫鉤，加強美國的區域威懾力以及支持美國的盟友。
While this approach may prove popular at home, it is a poor strategy, because
it misreads why congagement failed. From the perspective of China, America
was never some benign custodian of a rule-based order but instead a
belligerent hegemon, breaking international law to spread its liberal values
abroad. Given the imperial nature of this order and America’s reluctance to
change it, Chinese ambitions for its own were largely inevitable.
這種方式可能在國內很受歡迎，但卻是一個糟糕的戰略，因為它誤讀了“遏制加接觸”失
敗的原因。從中國的角度來看，美國從來都不是基於規則的秩序的好監護者，而是一個好
戰的霸主，頻頻違反國際法並向外傳播其價值觀。
For example, accommodation has long been a Chinese complaint. By some
metrics, China is already the world’s largest economy yet its influence in
the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund has typically lagged. This
disproportionate power offers America the opportunity to impose its own
political values onto others. The most common example of this being
conditionality lending, where recipients must also agree to political reforms
if they wish to qualify for aid. These reforms very often include human
rights provisions. China has long objected to such practices and its creation
of alternative economic institutions is a response to America’s reluctance
to address them. If America’s objective is Chinese integration into the
existing world order, then it should offer a variety of incentives to
integrate. This can not only mean economic growth but also institutional
power.
例如，中國一直在抱怨其在國際上所受的待遇。從某些度量方式來看（PPP），中國已經
是世界最大經濟體，然而他在世界銀行和國際貨幣基金組織裏的影響力遠遠同其經濟地位
不相稱。而美國擁有的不成比例的優勢地位可以讓其把自己的政治價值觀強加到其他國家
身上。最常見的例子是條件性貸款，即受援國必須同意進行政治改革才能獲得援助。中國
長期以來反對這種做法，它建立替代性經濟機構是對美國的回應。如果美國的目的是讓中
國融入現存世界秩序，那麽他應該提供更廣泛的激勵措施來吸引中國加入。這些激勵不能
僅僅是經濟增長，也需要是機構性或制度性的影響力。
Also motivating Chinese revisionism is the American hypocrisy regarding the
use of force. The liberal world order is alleged to have norms and
institutions discouraging conflict, where no one could extend its influence
using the force of its military. America, however, was exceptional, which
allowed it to violate these prohibitions whenever it determined there were
good reasons to do so.
促使中國改變現狀的還有美國在使用武力方面的虛偽性。據說，自由主義世界秩序有勸阻
沖突的規範和制度，沒有哪個國家可以利用軍力擴大其影響力。但美國是個例外，總是違
反這些禁令，而且覺得自己理由充
America needs to rethink how it is handling China’s rise. Its past strategy
has clearly failed considering China is not only pursuing a new regional
order but one that does not have a role for America. But instead of a
strategy of confrontation, America’s new approach should be centered around
accommodation and restraint.
美國需要反思如何應對中國的崛起。考慮到中國不僅在追求新的區域秩序，而且是一個沒
有美國角色的區域秩序，美國過去的戰略顯然已經破產。但是，美國的新路線不應該是對
抗，而應該是以接納和約束為中心。
This would mean ensuring international institutions reflect the current
distribution of world power. The Bretton Woods Institutions are not mere
instruments of the United States, but America’s outsized influence in these
institutions offers it unique opportunities to reform foreign politics in
liberal ways. It was the American reluctance to share power over these
organizations that incentivized China to create alternative ones.
這意味著確保國際機構反映當前世界權力的分配。正是美國不願分享權力，才促使中國建
立替代性組織。
America should also get serious about respecting the international law
prohibiting the use of force. China has rebuilt its military in large part
because it does not trust America to practice self-restraint. Considering how
often America has used its military over the last three decades, China would
be foolish not to. If America wants to be the leader of a world governed by
rules and not power, then it should lead by example, and only use its
military when it abides by the same rules it expects others to follow. This
would mean that if America uses force, it must have a United Nations mandate
or be acting in self-defense.
美國也應認真尊重禁止使用武力的國際法。中國重建其軍隊，很大程度上是因為不相信美
國會自我克制。考慮到美國過去30年頻頻動武，中國不這樣做將是愚蠢的。如果美國想成
為由規則而不是權力支配的世界的領導者，那麽就應該以身作則，遵守它期望別人遵守的
規則。這將意味著，如果美國使用武力，必須有聯合國的授權或出於自衛。
To acknowledge American abuses does not absolve China, however. America
demonstrated a great deal of tolerance for China’s long history of illiberal
economic policies and despite Beijing’s stringent defense of state
sovereignty, it has meddled in the politics of foreign countries from time to
time. But the point is for America to develop a new strategy by viewing its
own behavior through the eyes of its competitor. From Beijing’s perspective,
the liberal world order was merely a vehicle for America to impose its own
values on the rest of the world. Considering China has never shared those
values, and probably never will, it should not be surprising that it had
little interest in becoming a supporting member. America should therefore
work with China to reform the current order, appreciating that a new power
distribution exists as well as an awareness of how America’s own illiberal
behavior contributed to the previous order’s breakdown.
承認美國的一些錯誤並不意味著認同中國所做的一切。美國對中國長期的狹隘的經濟政策
一直展現著寬容。但是重點在於美國應該了解一下競爭者眼中的自己是什麽樣子，然後制
定出新的戰略。在北京看來，自由世界的秩序只是方便美國把自己的價值觀強加到其他國
家頭上。考慮到中國從來沒有把價值觀強加到其他國家頭上，可能以後也不會這樣做，中
國不想支持這種自由世界的秩序是情有可原的。美國因此應該同中國一起重新塑造現行秩
序。
Brian Clark is a foreign policy analyst with a research interest in American
grand strategy. His work has been published in The American Conservative.
Image: Reuters.
5.完整新聞連結 (或短網址):
https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/america-needs-rethink-how-it-handling-china%E2%80%99s-rise-193513
縮網址： https://reurl.cc/emEG0x
6.備註:
中國大陸已經基本脫離了貧困，目前有希望通過第三次收入調節，實現降低貧富差距，邁
向共同富裕。中國大陸這40年的成功，深深鼓舞了大陸人民對自己的信心，也讓中共在大
陸獲得極高支持率。美國不要在一廂情願地認定大陸人民需要他們推銷的所謂“民主”。
民主就是以民為主，首要的是照顧人民的生命。自武漢的新冠疫情爆發以來，大陸有力控
制疫情，全民免費醫治新冠，讓大陸至今的死亡人數非常之少。這才是真正的以人民為本
。