1.媒體來源:
Economics
經濟學人
2.完整新聞標題:
Whether to believe China's GDP figures
是否該相信中國GDP數據
3.完整新聞內文:
IT ALL seems a little too perfect to be true. The Chinese government set a g
rowth target of “about 7%” this year. And for a second consecutive quarter
, despite ample evidence of stress in its industrial sector, it managed to h
it that right on its head. In the three months from April to June, the econo
my expanded 7% compared with the same period a year earlier. Cue the chorus
of scepticism: Chinese data just cannot be trusted, goes the usual refrain.
Yes and no. There is a difference between smoothing data and totally fabrica
ting it. Evidence suggests that China is guilty of the former (the lesser ch
arge) but not the latter (the more serious allegation).
這一切看起來有些太過完美以致顯得不真實。中國政府今年制定了“7%”的增長目標。
連續兩個季度，經過有充分證據表明工業部門承受著壓力，政府仍成功達成了目標。在
四月到六月的三個月里，與上年同期相比經濟增長了7%。這暗合了那些懷疑論：中國的
數據不可信。這既對也不對，平滑的數據與完全捏造的數據是有區別的。有證據表明是
中國屬于前者，而不是后者。
China has a history of ironing out the ruffles in its growth figures. No les
s an authority than Li Keqiang, now the premier, once said that local GDP da
ta were "man-made and therefore unreliable". The most notorious case of mani
pulation came in 1998 in the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis. Many A
sian countries suffered recessions but China claimed to grow by a hefty 7.8%
that year. Looking at other indicators, many economists concluded that grow
th was in fact closer to 5%. The manipulations can occasionally work in the
opposite direction. In the early 2000s, when China reported growth of 8-9%,
some reckoned that it really expanded by closer to 10%. Why would China unde
rstate its growth? One possibility is that statisticians missed big parts of
the economy. Another is that the government downplayed its strength to avoi
d arousing anger at a time when its export juggernaut was beginning to rev u
p.
中國有減少經濟增長數據波動的歷史。沒有比現任總理李克強曾說過地方GDP數據“有人
為痕跡，不可信”更能說明這點了。最臭名昭著的操縱事件發生在亞洲經融危機之后的
1998年。許多亞洲國家都遭受了經濟衰退，但中國那年聲稱自己增長了7.8%。通過其他
指標看，許多經濟學家認為增長實際上接近5%。中國有時也會向與此相反的方向偽造數
據。在本世紀初，當中國以8-9%增長時，有些人測算其增速接近10%。為什么中國要低估
其增長？一種可能性是統計人員忽視了經濟中的很大一部分。另一種可能性是政府為了
掩藏自己的力量，以避免當時其開始加速成長的強大出口引起他國憤怒。
As China’s economy has become more crucial to rest of the world, its data h
ave also come under closer scrutiny. The theory was that this would make it
harder for its boffins to play with GDP numbers. In the first quarter, thoug
h, major doubts resurfaced. Industrial production fell to its weakest growth
since the depths of the global financial crisis, while the property market,
a pillar of the economy, slumped. When China reported real growth of 7% yea
r-on-year in the first quarter, economists noted that this did not stack up
with its nominal growth of 5.8%. The only way to arrive at the higher real f
igure was to record a GDP deflator of -1.1%, implying that the economy suffe
red broad-based deflation, a bizarre development when consumer prices rose b
y more than 1% at the same time. Had the GDP deflator been accurately estima
ted, Chang Liu and Mark Williams of Capital Economics reckoned, real growth
in the first quarter would have been about one or two percentage points lowe
r.
隨著中國經濟在世界中變得越來越重要，它的數據也受到更嚴格的審查。理論上這使得
玩弄GDP數據變得更加困難。在第一季度，主要疑點浮出水面。工業生產增長率下滑至經
融危機后的最低點，同時，作為經濟支柱之一的房地產大幅下降。當中國報道其第一季
度同比實際增長率為7%時，經濟學家指出其5.8%的名義增長并不能達成這個數據。唯一
達成這實際增長數據的方法是有-1.1%的GDP平減指數。這表明經濟遭受了廣泛的通貨緊
縮。但離奇的是同是消費者價格在同期增長了超過1%。凱投宏觀的Chang Liu 和 Mark
Williams 測算，第一季度的實際增長要低一到兩個百分點。
China’s new data, published today, appear to be more credible. In nominal t
erms, growth rebounded strongly from 5.8% year-on-year in the first quarter
to 7.1% in the second quarter. The corollary is that the GDP deflator went f
rom deflation of 1.1% to inflation of 0.1%, a reading that is much more cons
istent with rising consumer prices and falling producer prices. Still, there
were signs of some tampering. Without providing any explanation, the nation
al bureau of statistics lowered the quarter-on-quarter growth rate of the se
cond quarter of 2014 to 1.9% from 2%. The effect was likely to lower the bas
e of comparison for the second quarter of 2015, flattering the year-on-year
growth rate. The impact, though, would have been relatively small: a few ten
ths of a percentage point, not a few percentage points.
中國的最新數據在今日公布，該數據看起來更為可信。在名義上，同比增長在第二季度
強勁反彈，從第一季度的5.8%增長到了7.1%。其必然結果是GDP平減指數從通縮1.1%變成
了通脹0.1%，這與增長的消費者價格和下降生產者價格更加一致。不過，仍然有一些篡
改的跡象。沒做任何解釋，國家統計局將2014年第二季度的環比增長率從2%降到了1.9%
。其效果是使2015年第二季度有了更低的比較基數，讓同比增長率更加好看。這產生的
影響比較小：影響的是零點幾個百分點，而不是幾個百分點。
What’s more, the sources of Chinese growth in the second quarter were less
mysterious than in the first quarter. While investment continued to slow, se
rvices accelerated. The industrial sector grew 6.1% year-on-year in the firs
t half, down from 6.4% in the first quarter. By contrast, the services secto
r jumped to 8.4% growth from 7.9% in the first quarter. That matters since s
ervices now occupy a larger share of Chinese GDP than industry. There is rea
son to doubt the sustainability of the services strength. It was predicated
to a large extent on financial services benefiting from the stockmarket bubb
le that popped last month. But the gains for financial services, whether tra
nsient or not, were real. China’s statisticians did not invent them.
而且，二季度中國經濟增長的來源與第一季度相比也不那么神秘。投資繼續放緩，服務
業加速上升。上半年工業部門同比增長6.1%，比第一季度的6.4%低。相比之下，服務業
的增長率從第一季度的7.9%躍升至8.4%。現在服務業在中國GDP中所占比重大于工業，不
過有理由懷疑服務業增長的可持續性。它很大程度上得益于金融服務，而上個月股市泡
沫發生破滅。但不管是不是暫時的，金融服務業的增長是真實的，中國的統計人員沒有
發明它們。
4.完整新聞連結 (或短網址):
http://www.economist.com/blogs/freeexchange/2015/07/chinese-economy
5.備註:
一兩次的數據造假很容易，長期的數據造假幾乎是不可能的事。